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THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY is undergoing frenzied
and chaotic changes. The prospect of some type of health
reform, the increasingly competitive environment, and the ag-
gressive development of new delivery and financing modes have
combined to produce a fundamental restructuring within the
industry. This industry transition is particularly affected by
three broad areas of federal law: (1) the laws governing Medi-
care and Medicaid fraud, abuse, and self-referrals; (2) the pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code establishing the condi-
tions by which hospitals and other providers may be exempted
from federal taxes; and (3) the antitrust laws.
This Note will discuss the impact and interrelationships of
these federal laws on the development of an integrated health
care industry. At the micro-level, an integrated delivery system
is "a network of organizations that provides or arranges to pro-
vide a coordinated continuum of services to a defined popula-
tion and is willing to be held clinically and fiscally accountable
for the outcomes and the health status of the population
served."' While extensive foundational literature is available on
the theories, rationale, and legal and economic principles un-
derlying each of the three areas of law that are the subjects of
this Note, this Note analyzes the interrelationships among
these areas and proposes several initiatives to improve the fed-
eral law governing health care providers.
This Note will analyze four problems for health care prov-
iders undertaking integrated delivery system development.
First, each body of law contains inherent barriers to the devel-
opment of new organizational models that are the centerpiece
of private health care system reforms. Second, the application
of rules to different types of health care organizations is not
1. Stephen M. Shortell, Creating Organized Delivery Systems: The Barriers and
Facilitators, 38 Hosv. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 447, 448 (1993).
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always consistent, and the differences are often not justified.
Third, the laws themselves and the regulatory apparatus gov-
erning health care providers often result in tensions and incon-
sistencies in federal law. The lack of a coordinated regulatory
agenda creates special problems for integrated delivery system
development. Finally, proposed solutions to these problems are
notably absent from the recent health reform debate.
In response to these problems, this Note identifies a pro-
cess and a proposed agenda for resolving these conflicts. The
ultimate goal of these proposals is to develop a process for har-
monizing provider standards that identifies and elaborates upon
the underlying value conflicts among federal health care laws
while respecting the discrete rationale and legal principles in
each area. Without regard to the timing or outcome of health
reform at the national level, existing mechanisms may be used
to improve the federal laws governing integrated system
development.
I. BACKGROUND
The health care industry is undergoing a major realign-
ment in its basic structures and assumptions.' Historically,
health care has been a fragmented industry characterized by
legally separate provider entities and separate payor and pro-
vider organizations. Problems associated with industry frag-
mentation include duplication among providers,3 fragmented
episodic care,4 the lack of economies of scale,5 gaps in insur-
ance payments, and conflicting financial incentives among prov-
iders and between payors and providers.6
Several interrelated factors have combined to propel the
movement away from a fragmented industry toward an inte-
grated industry. A new environment of "managed competition"
has emerged in which brokers, including the government and
2. RUSSELL C. COILE. JR.. THE NEW GOVERNANCE: STRATEGIES FOR AN ERA OF
HEALTH REFORM 3 (1994).
3. Kevin Lumsdon, Home- and Community-based Programs Integrate Acute and
Long-Term Care: Bridging the Gap, Hosps., Dec. 5, 1993, at 44, 44; Gerald R. Peters,
Integrated Delivery Can Ally Physician and Hospital Plans, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT.,
Dec. 1991, at 21, 21.
4. CoILE, supra note 2, at 136-37.
5. Id.
6. See Paul M. Ellwood, Jr., When MDs Meet DRGs, HosPs., Dec. 16, 1983, at 62,
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large employers, manage the process of informed consumer
choices toward high-quality, economical health care plans.7 Al-
though the 103d Congress did not pass major health reform
legislation, President Clinton and Republican and Democratic
leaders of Congress intend to continue the debate in the current
Congress.8 The prospect of health reform at the federal level
and the reality of private sector managed competition initia-
tives have further accelerated integrated delivery system
development.9
Purchasers are demanding performance measures for de-
fined patient populations. Developing health status outcomes
and demonstrating cost-effectiveness for large patient popula-
tions requires clinical integration of health care services from a
patient-centered perspective, physician integration through eco-
nomic linkages, governance, and management, and the func-
tional integration of strategic planning and quality improve-
7. Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the
1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Econ-
omy, (pt. 1), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29, 31-35 (1989). Within this environment, competi-
tion exists at the plan level for annual contracts to serve a participating population. Id. at
31. Under President Clinton's proposed health reform plan, these "accountable health
plans" would have contracted with state or regional health alliances to qualify for reim-
bursement under a national set of health care benefits. John Wesler, Tax Exempt Status
for Hospitals and HMOs Under the Health Security Act, 26 J. HEALTH & HosP L 353,
353 (1993).
For a proposed classification and definition of managed care monikers, the reader is
directed to the work of Weiner and Lissovoy. The development of managed care has been
accompanied by a virtual alphabet soup of acronyms including HMOs (health maintenance
organizations), PPOs (preferred provider organizations), POS (point-of-service plans), and
IPAs (independent practice associations). Johnathan P. Weiner & Gregory de Lissovoy,
Razing a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans,
18 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L. 75, 77-78 (1993) [hereinafter Babel].
While managed competition refers to the process of managing the competition among
health plans, managed care refers to the methods used by plans and providers to manage
the resources expended on patient care. Id. at 97-98.
8. Diane E. Kirrane, Healthcare Reform: What the Future Holds, HEALTHCARE Ex-
ECUTIVE, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 6, 7. Meanwhile, state and local governments are introducing
reforms, and absent federal reforms, providers will continue responding to the forces of
managed competition. Id.
9. Stephen W. Bernstein, Hospital Mergers, Acquisitions and Affiliations: The
Anatomy of Motivations, Models, Process and Legal Considerations, in HEALTH CARE
LAW 1993, at 77, 77-78 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4428,
1993). Bernstein also notes other driving factors such as the conservation of limited re-
sources, the elimination of duplication, and the conversion of acute care facilities toward
outpatient care. Id.
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ment.' 0 Further, health reform initiatives have accelerated inte-
grated delivery system development as providers combine to fa-
cilitate contracts with qualified health plans or to become qual-
ified health plans and contract with health care purchasing
groups, the "power buyers" under managed competition."'
Health plans also must integrate horizontally to include enough
providers to meet patient needs.'2
Other factors facilitating integration include Medicare re-
imbursement reforms giving hospitals and physicians financial
incentives to manage the continuum of care,13 the need for re-
ductions in the administrative costs of managing care, 14 and the
need for capital transfers between acute care and primary care
organizations to meet community needs.' 5 Finally, as will be
discussed later, the anti-kickback, self-referral, tax-exemption,
and antitrust laws have to some extent encouraged integration,
especially among physicians. 6
The movement toward an integrated industry includes af-
filiations among physicians,'7 alliances between physicians and
10. Robin R. Gillies, Conceptualizing and Measuring Integration: Findings from the
Health Systems Integration Study, 38 Hosp. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 467, 468-70
(1993).
11. Robert E. Bloch & Donald M. Falk, Antitrust, Competition, and Health Care
Reform, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 206, 207-10.
12. Id. at 210.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1988) (providing acute care hospitals with incentives
to manage inpatient length-of-stay and ancillary service utilization); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4
(Supp. IV 1993) (providing physician incentives for primary care and reduction of office
overhead); 42 C.F.R. § 412 (1993) (ending separate hospital reimbursement for capital
expenditures). See also Douglas A. Conrad, Coordinating Patient Care Services in Re-
gional Health Systems: The Challenge of Clinical Integration, 38 Hosp. & HEALTH SER-
VICES ADMIN 491, 501 (1993) (noting that as payment becomes more global, providers
have stronger incentives to develop closer relationships for managing care); Robert Porter
Lynch, The Coming Alliance Revolution in Health Care, 19 PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE 21
(1993) (characterizing the resulting shift in provider thinking from fee-for-service to "ser-
vice for a fee").
14. Anne K. Gauthier et al., Administrative Costs in the U.S. Health Care System:
The Problem or the Solution?, 29 INQUIRY 308, 316 (1992).
15. Gerald R. Peters, Organizational and Business Issues Affecting Integrated De-
livery Systems, TOpiCS IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING, Spring 1994, at 1, 2-3. Health care
delivery is shifting from the inpatient to the outpatient setting. As a result, capital will be
needed for new facility construction, information system development, and physician re-
cruitment and retention. Id.
16. See generally James G. Wiehl, "Physician Integration". The Legal Pressures for
Consolidation of Health Care Services, 34 ST. Louis U. U. 917 (1990) (discussing the
pressures that anti-kickback, self-referral, and antitrust laws place on physicians to inte-
grate with one another).
17. Id. at 919-22 (discussing the market pressures for physician integration). See
also Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s:
1995]
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hospitals,'" and combinations of health care financing and de-
livery.19 Various legal models have evolved based on the domi-
nant central organization and the degree of provider integra-
tion. Within an integrated delivery system, one central
organization typically manages the entire system.20 For exam-
ple, different models include systems controlled by hospitals or
physicians,2" HMO models,22 and the equity model owned by
shareholders. Considerable conflict for control has ensued as
hospitals, physicians, HMOs, and insurers vie for network lead-
ership.23 The degree of integration differentiates the transi-
tional or "entry models" of integration such as management
service organizations, group practices without walls, and physi-
cian-hospital organizations (PHOs) 24 from the fully integrated
Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy (pt.
2), 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 94, 96 (1989) (noting that physician affiliations include IPAs
and group practices).
18. Sally Berger & Susan K. Sudman, M.D.-Hospital Integration: Staying on
Course, HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE, May-Jun. 1994, at 9 (stating that 27% of hospitals
have created physician-hospital organizational arrangements, and 97% expect to create
such an arrangement within two years).
19. COILE, supra note 2, at 137-38; Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 17, at 95-96.
National networks of HMOs also are being formed to decrease administrative costs and
meet the needs of national employers. See Julie Johnsson, National HMO Networks Court
Big Employers, Hosps., Sept. 5, 1990, at 80.
20. Charles F. Kaiser & John F. Reilly, Integrated Delivery Systems, I R S EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PRO-
GRAM TEXTBOOK (1993), reprinted in EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 212, 213 (Nov. Supp.,
1993) [hereinafter IRS 1994 TEXTBOOK].
21. Della de Lafuente, Doctors' Orders: Integrate, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 3,
1993, at 25; Peters, supra note 15, at 4-7. Horizontal systems are typically controlled by
more than one entity such as a hospital corporation and a physician organization. Peters,
supra note 3, at 30-32.
22. HMOs encompass four basic organizational models depending on the relation-
ship with physicians: the group-model, staff-model, network-model, and IPAs. INTRODUC-
TION TO ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY MECHANISMS: HMOs. PPOs. & CMPs 6-7, (Jeanie M.
Johnson ed., 1986); Babel, supra note 7, at 96. Physicians are directly employed by staff
model HMOs and typically receive a fixed salary and performance bonus. Group-model
HMOs contract with a large multi-specialty practice on a fixed fee basis. Physician services
are typically offered under a "closed panel" or exclusive basis in both staff- and group-
model HMOs. In contrast, the network-model and IPA models are typically "open panel"
and contract with a network of existing group practices ("the network model") or a physi-
cian association (the "IPA model"). Id.
Kaiser-Permanente, a closed-panel plan, also operates its own network of clinics and
hospitals. PAUL STARR. THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 322
(1982).
23. Terese Hudson, The Race to Integrate: Who Will Be the Leaders?, HosPs &
HEALTH NETWORKS, June 5, 1993, at 24.
24. For a discussion of PHO organizational forms, see generally Peter M. Friend &
Spence Meighan, Driving Forces Behind Integration. Weigh Your Options, HEALTHCARE
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structures that include physicians, hospitals, and insurance
products within one organization.25 These models often overlap,
and hybrid models are common.26
Whatever integration model providers choose, the move-
ment toward integration involves numerous transactions and
arrangements that have important legal consequences. As the
next section explains, the federal anti-kickback and self-refer-
ral, tax exemption, and antitrust laws place significant restric-
tions on integrated delivery system development.
II. FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRANSITION
TOWARD INTEGRATION
As integrated delivery systems accept increased responsi-
bilities for coordinating care among providers and assume ac-
countability for financial results through integrated delivery
and financing or risk-sharing arrangements, the economic in-
centives of fee-for-service health care are eroding.27 Federal
laws regulating provider behavior historically have been
designed to address the problems that arise in a fragmented
industry.28 With the development of managed competition,
EXECUTIVE, May-Jun. 1994, at 13 (discussing the respective hospital and physician per-
spectives and the relative degree of control and economic security provided in management
service organizations, physician-hospital organizations, practice acquisition models, and eq-
uity models).
25. COILE, supra note 2, at 52-53, 167-73. See also Terese Hudson, Three Major
Models: Before You Build Your Network, Consider These Legal Angles - Management
Services Organizations, Medical Foundations, Fully Integrated Entity, Hosps., June 20,
1993, at 31; Peters, supra note 15, at 3.
26. See Babel, supra note 7, at 77-79; Terese Hudson, Reform Follows Market:
Insurers. Providers Strengthen Ties as Debate Continues, Hosps., Feb. 5, 1993, at 28, 28;
Julie Johnsson, Managed Care in the 1990s: Providers' New Role for Innovative Health
Delivery, Hosps, Mar. 20, 1992, at 26.
27. In contrast with fee-for-service, capitated payment systems provide fixed pay-
ments for all care delivered by providers, resulting in incentives to coordinate the delivery
of care and provide only medically appropriate services. Stephen F. Jencks & George J.
Schieber, Containing U.S. Health Care Costs: What Bullet to Bite?, 13 HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV. 1, 7 (Supp. 1991). Similarly, the bundling of hospital and physician fees
into a single payment rate results in incentives to optimize the covered services provided as
inexpensively as possible. Id.
28. See Peter A. Pavarini & Catherine T. Dunlay, The Impact of Clinton's Health
Care Reform Plan on the Managed Care Industry, 10 Healthspan (P-H L. & Bus.) No. 3,
at 3, 8 (Mar. 1993) (discussing the need in light of health reform for a reexamination of
fraud and abuse laws, tax exemption, antitrust, and ERISA as well as state laws in the
areas of licensure, the corporate practice of medicine, certificate of need, and insurance
regulation); Beth Schermer & Karen C. Owens, Antitrust Regulators Have Been Reasona-
ble About Managed Care, but Bans on Provider Self-referrals Remain an Obstacle, NAT'L
1995]
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these same laws contradict the economic theories and founda-
tions of recent health reform efforts. As a result, there are in-
herent barriers that anti-kickback, self-referral, tax exemption,
and antitrust laws place before providers in the transition to-
ward an integrated industry.
A. Anti-kickback and Self-referral Laws
The Medicare-Medicaid anti-kickback law prohibits the
knowing and willful remuneration for Medicare and Medicaid
patient referrals.2 9 The self-referral law prohibits physician fi-
nancial interests in facilities that may profit from a Medicare
or Medicaid referral for designated health services.30 Both laws
were designed to safeguard the Medicare program assets from
provider conflicts of interests that may result in unnecessary
services."' According to the former Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) Inspector General, the purpose of the
anti-kickback statute was to prevent overutilization, contain
Medicare and Medicaid costs, preserve patient choice among
providers, and diminish the market distortion of referral fees. 2
Similarly, the concerns that entities may lock-in physician re-
LJ., Jan. 24, 1994, at 26, 26 (arguing that antitrust, fraud and abuse, and self-referral
laws run counter to virtually all of the reform proposals considered by Congress).
29. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting the knowing and willful solicitation or receipt or offer or pay-
ment, of any direct or indirect remuneration, in return for a referral, arranging for refer-
rals, recommending, purchasing, ordering, or leasing services covered by Medicare or
Medicaid). See also Richard P. Kusserow, The Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Stat-
ute and the Safe Harbor Regulations - What's Next?, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 49, 49-53
(1992) (discussing the history of the anti-kickback statute). Relevant statutory exceptions
include bona fide employees and safe harbors promulgated by the Department of HHS. See
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(3)(B), (E) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
30. Self-referral Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting physician
referrals of Medicare and Medicaid patients to entities furnishing designated health ser-
vices with which the physician has a financial interest, including ownership or investment
interests or compensation arrangements). See also Wiehl, supra note 16, at 933-35 (dis-
cussing the legislative history of the self-referral statute). Designated health services in-
clude clinical lab services, physical and occupational therapy, home health, radiation ther-
apy, radiology services, durable medical equipment, parenteral and enteral nutrition,
prosthetics and orthotics, outpatient prescription drugs, and inpatient and outpatient hospi-
tal services. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6) (Supp. V 1993).
31. Kimberly A. King, Comment, Regulating Physician Investment and Referral
Behavior in the Competitive Health Care Marketplace of the '90's - An Argument for
Decentralization, 65 WASH. L. REv. 657, 660-61 (1990) (discussing the congressional in-
tent of the anti-kickback statute); Susan Tedrick, Commentary, Legal Issues in Physician
Self-Referral and Other Health Care Relationships, 13 J. LEGAL MED 521, 527 (1992).
32. Kusserow, supra note 29, at 52-53.
[Vol. 5:181
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ferrals, patients may not be referred to convenient facilities,
unnecessary services may be ordered, and honest competition
may be undercut were the impetus for physician self-referral
proscriptions13 Anti-kickback violators are subject to criminal
sanctions and civil sanctions including Medicare program ex-
clusion and monetary fines. 4 Self-referral penalties include
payment denial, program exclusion, and civil monetary
penalties.35
The HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) has statutory
authority for anti-kickback civil sanction enforcement and is
mandated to promulgate "safe harbor" regulations regarding
permissive practices not subject to criminal prosecution or ex-
clusion.3 6 Although HHS has promulgated limited safe harbor
exceptions, a proposed general rule would create a distinction
between the substance and the form of health care transactions
and prevent "sham transactions" from obtaining shelter under
the safe harbors.37 Some argue that the proposed rule under-
cuts the statutory intent to delineate safe business practices and
33. 135 CONG. REC. H240-01 (1989) (comments by Congressman Stark on the in-
troduction of the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989). For a discussion of the relation-
ship between physicians' ordering practices and their ownership and compensation arrange-
ments, see generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BusI-
NESSES, Pub. No. OAI-12-88-01419, reprinted in 2 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
§ 37,838 (1989); Bruce J. Hillman et al., Frequency & Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in
Office Practice - A Comparison of Self-referring and Radiologist-referring Physicians,
323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1604 (1990) (finding that physicians using radiology equipment in
their office ordered four to four-and-a-half times more imaging exams and charged signifi-
cantly higher interpretation fees than radiologists); John K. Iglehart, The Debate over Phy-
sician Ownership of Health Care Facilities, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198, 202 (1989) (dis-
cussing findings that clinical laboratory utilization was 45 % higher among patients treated
by physicians with clinical laboratory ownership or investment interests than patients in
general); Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, Physician Ownership of Physical Therapy Ser-
vices: Effects on Charges, Utilization, Profits, and Service Characteristics, 268 JAMA
2055 (1992) (finding significantly higher utilization, revenue per patient, and profits in
physical therapy facilities owned by referring physicians).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (imposing felony sanctions);
§ 1320a-7 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (imposing civil monetary penalties and Medicare and
Medicaid program exclusion).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g) (Supp. V 1993). Circumvention schemes by physicians
or other entities also may be penalized with civil fines of $100,000. Id. § 1395nn(g)(4).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(E) (Supp. V 1993). The Justice Department has
jurisdiction over anti-kickback criminal violations. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,959 (1991)
(commenting on regulations codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
37. See 59 Fed. Reg. 37,202, 37,203, 37,208 (1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
1001.954) (proposed July 21, 1994). The proposed rule states "[a]ny transaction or other
device entered into or employed for the purpose of appearing to fit within a safe harbor
when the substance of the transaction or device is not accurately reflected by the form will
1995]
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"effectively guts" the existing safe harbors.3 8 HHS also en-
forces the self-referral statute, but there is no authority for safe
harbors. Instead, statutory exceptions for self-referrals include
referrals from among employees, prepaid plans, group prac-
tices, and rural providers, and personal service arrangements,
physician recruitment, and hospitals owned by physicians."
The primary obstacle of the anti-kickback statute placed
before providers who are interested in developing integrated de-
livery systems is the lack of clarity regarding lawful transac-
tions. Courts have interpreted the statute broadly, casting a
wide net for lawful health care transactions despite the egre-
gious facts of the transactions found to be illegal.4 ° The safe
harbors promulgated thus far have been too narrow.' Public
comments on the recently proposed "sham transaction" rule
have been uniformly critical of the OIG's inability to provide
coherent, objective criteria for beneficial transactions.'2 The
OIG also has been criticized for its tendency to condemn
broadly physician and hospital transactions without either re-
be disregarded, and whether the arrangement receives the protection of a safe harbor will
be determined by the substance of the transaction or device." Id. at 37,208.
38. See Proposed 'Sham Transaction' Section Riles Commentators on Safe
Harbors, 3 Health Law Rep. (BNA), No. 40, at 1451 (Oct. 13, 1994). Existing safe
harbors include qualified investments in small entities, sales of physician practices, employ-
ment relationships, personal service and management contracts, and managed care organi-
zations. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1993), 59 Fed. Reg. 37,202 (1994) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (proposed July 21, 1994); 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008 (1993) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (proposed Sept. 21, 1993).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)-(e) (Supp. V 1993).
40. C. Kelly McCourt, Legislative & Regulatory Analysis: Recent Developments in
Interpretations of Medicare's Illegal Remuneration Prohibitions, 4 MED. STAFF COUN-
SELOR 65, 67 (1990). For cases that broadly interpret the anti-kickback statute, see gener-
ally United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20 (1st
Cir. 1989) (upholding the convictions of a hospital employee and the president of an ambu-
lance company for receiving and providing automobiles and other compensation in return
for recommending a hospital contract for ambulance company services); United States v.
Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding the conviction of a physician for receiving a
50% kickback for referral of blood and urine samples to a laboratory); United States v.
Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985) (upholding the
conviction of a cardiologist who paid interpretation fees to physicians referring patients for
Holter monitoring because one purpose of the fees was to induce referrals); Inspector Gen-
eral v. The Hanlester Network, 1991 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 39,566 (HHS
Departmental Appeals Bd., Appellate Div., Sept. 18, 1991).
41. See King, supra note 31, at 670-71; Medicare, Medicaid Safe Harbor Rules Too
Narrow. Restrictive, Comments Say, I Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1691
(Dec. 6, 1993).
42. See Proposed 'Sham Transaction' Section Riles Commentators on Safe
Harbors, supra notc 38. See also supra notes 37-38 and surrounding text.
[Vol. 5:181
INTEGRATED DELIVERY SYSTEMS
ferring to relevant facts or availing itself of the opportunity to
understand integrated delivery systems better.4"
Many business transactions considered customary in the
commercial world are prohibited, resulting in a minefield for
the health lawyer,44 traps for the unwary, and extensive trans-
action costs45 for providers undertaking integrated delivery sys-
tem development. Clarity is also needed for integrated delivery
system development to proceed because murky statutes protect
the most devious of players.46
A principal reason that the anti-kickback and self-referral
laws have been roundly criticized is that their basic assump-
tions and rationale grew out of concerns regarding the fee-for-
service system that become less relevant in a managed competi-
tion environment. 47 The anti-kickback statute was merely a
means to the end of curbing the potential abuses of fee-for-
service incentives and "was never intended to affect the struc-
ture of health care delivery in isolation from these goals."48
43. Gerald R. Peters, How to Develop an IDS, Address Before the National Health
Lawyers Association (Oct. 10, 1993) in TAX IssuEs IN NONPROFIT HEALTHCARE ORGANI-
ZATIONS, 1993, at 21 (abstract available from the National Health Lawyers Association)
[hereinafter Peters Address] (criticizing pronouncements by OIG). But see Gerald R. Pe-
ters, A Practical Examination of the IRS and OIG Rules for Integrated Delivery Systems,
7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 765, 769 (1993) [hereinafter Peters, Practical Examination]
(predicting that the OIG will reconsider its positions once fully informed of the integrated
delivery system development process).
Similarly, courts do not consider defenses, such as cost-effectiveness, that may justify
referral arrangements. King, supra note 31, at 669-70. As a result, anti-kickback and self-
referral laws "unduly complicate" integrated delivery systems development. Schermer &
Owens, supra note 28, at 26.
44. See Francis J. Hearn, Jr., Comment, Curing the Health Care Industry: Govern-
ment Response to Medicare Fraud and Abuse, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 175,
176-77 (1989). The legal ambiguities have led to ethical issues for lawyers who must
choose between advising clients to forego cost-effective transactions that improve health
care delivery or to enter into illegal arrangements where the risk of prosecution is slight.
Id.
45. See Tedrick, supra note 31, at 557. Frankford argues that the cost of anti-kick-
back compliance and enforcement is not merited by the resources saved. David M. Frank-
ford, Creating and Dividing the Fruits of Collective Economic Activity: Referrals Among
Health Care Providers, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1861, 1895-96 (1989).
46. Pamela L. Gorski, Note, The Big Chill: Safe Harbors in the Medicare and
Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Statutes, 5 J.L. & HEALTH 237, 254 (1991).
47. See, e.g., Schermer & Owens, supra note 28, at 26 (arguing that anti-kickback
and self-referral laws fail to recognize adequately the nature of managed care and provider
economic risk sharing).
48. David A. Hyman & Joel V. Williamson, Fraud & Abuse: Regulatory Alterna-
tives In a 'Competitive' Health Care Era, 19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1133, 1166 (1988).
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Commentators have requested that HHS promulgate addi-
tional safe harbors for managed care plans,4" and HHS has at-
tempted to respond to these concerns with the development of
the managed care organization safe harbors.50 However, none
of the safe harbor regulations deal with integrated delivery sys-
tems that provide managed care, and HHS does not intend to
update any of its pronouncements regarding illegal activities to
account for integrated delivery systems development.5 1
The managed care safe harbors afford little protection to
providers and are incongruent with health reform efforts to pro-
mote networking among providers.52 Additional safe harbors
have not been forthcoming, and as a result, commentators have
recommended supplemental safe harbors where structural pro-
tections are present to protect against overutilization. 5' The
OIG has suggested that President Clinton's health reform task
force was well aware of the problems surrounding integrated
delivery system development, but the OIG does not have any
49. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,960 (1991) (commenting on regulations codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 1001).
50. See 42 C.F.R. 1001.952 (k)-(m) (1993). HHS solicited comments on a variety of
managed care arrangements, but only prepaid risk-based and cost-based health plans con-
tracting with HCFA and state regulated health plans are covered under the safe harbor. 57
Fed. Reg. 52,723, 52,725-26 (1992) (commenting on regulations codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
1001). Revisions to the interim final rule are on the 1995 HHS regulatory agenda. 59 Fed.
Reg. 57,545, 57,546 (1994) (notifying the public of the 1995 HHS agenda). See also dis-
cussion infra part III.B.1.
51. HHS Reiterates Conservative Approach in Response to AHA's Guidance Re-
quest, 5 Medicare Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 276 (Mar. 8, 1994) [hereinafter HHS Reiter-
ates]. The Chief Counsel for the OIG has stated that further updates are not necessary
because the safe harbors, fraud alerts, and speeches by HHS staff provide more advice on
the anti-kickback statute "than any other part of the U.S. Code." Id.
52. Schermer & Owens, supra note 28, at 26. Because the safe harbors provide
greater protection to fully integrated systems, Thornton has acknowledged that the anti-
kickback policies encourage marriage while prohibiting dating. D. McCarty Thornton, Im-
pact of the Anti-kickback Statute and the Stark Amendment on Vertically Integrated De-
livery Systems in the Health Care Industry, Address Before the National Health Lawyers
Association (Oct. 13, 1994), in HEALTHCARE FRAUD AND ABUSE, 1994, at 1, 14 (abstract
available from the National Health Lawyers Association).
53. See John J. Farley, Note, The Medicare Antifraud Statute & Safe Harbor Reg-
ulations: Suggestions for Change, 81 GEO. L.J. 167, 191 (1992) (recommending that HHS
craft safe harbors for organizational arrangements that have sufficient external controls
that "control costs, encourage efficiency and protect against overutilization"); Hyman &
Williamson, supra note 48, at 1185-95 (recommending "generic" safe harbors for reasona-
ble and legitimate health care transactions that do not harm the Medicare program or
beneficiaries); King, supra note 31, at 671 (recommending Congress set guidelines and
delegate enforcement authority to state government). The OIG prefers bright line rules due
to the lack of objective guidance in generic safe harbors. Kusserow, supra note 29, at 52-
53.
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solutions to offer other than its lack of concern for enforcing
the law on capitated systems or where prices for hospital and
physician services are bundled. 4 Presumably, the lack of OIG
concern is due to the complication of proving a "knowing and
willful" violation when the payment incentive structure allevi-
ates the inducement for referrals. Certainly, supplemental pro-
tections would facilitate integrated delivery systems
development.
The self-referral statute excepts referrals from physicians
to hospitals that they own. 5 A similar concept has been recom-
mended for safe harbor protection under anti-kickback law.56
The rationale for this exception is that physician owners are
subject to the financial incentives of hospital prospective pay-
ment 57 and to hospital quality assurance and utilization re-
view. 8 As a result, the risk of overutilization is minimized. 9
The same argument may be made for physician investment in
integrated delivery systems. Since an integrated delivery sys-
tem assumes fiscal and legal responsibility for the entire spec-
trum of care, the risk of overutilization by physician investors
is minimized.
Two exceptions in the anti-kickback safe harbors and the
self-referral statute may encourage physician integration. The
group practice exceptions"0 allow referrals among physicians in
the same group. The employee exceptions 61 allow physician
54. D. McCarty Thornton, Self-Referrals: A Recent History, Address Before the
National Health Lawyers Association (Sept. 27, 1993), in HEALTHCARE FRAUD AND
ABUSE: ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990s, 1993, at 10-11 (abstract available from National
Health Lawyers Association). Neither capitation nor bundling of hospital and physician
fees reward providers for referrals of covered services. For definitions of these terms, see
supra note 27.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
56. See Farley, supra note 53, at 191.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1988) (establishing fixed hospital payment rates based
on diagnostic categories).
58. Peer Review Organizations, or PROs, monitor the quality and utilization of ser-
vices provided to Medicare patients in hospitals, HMOs, skilled nursing facilities, ambula-
tory surgery settings, and home health care agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3, c-13 (1988). If
the PRO determines that the service was not medically necessary, Medicare may deny
payment.
59. A Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board study seems to support this
supposition. Farley, supra note 53, at 190.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993); 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008, 49,010 (1993)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (proposed Sept. 21, 1993).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2) (Supp. V
1993).
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compensation arrangements where a bona fide employment re-
lationship exists between the referring physician and the physi-
cian receiving the referral under the theory that employer lia-
bility for employee acts will provide sufficient protections
against abuse.62 Group practice and employment exceptions
have led to practice consolidation among physicians and em-
ployment of physicians by hospitals and HMOs. 63
Vertical integration of physicians with hospitals does not
receive the same level of protection. Hospital integration ar-
rangements typically include physician practice acquisition and
subsequent physician employment, especially for the primary
care physician component that is essential to success under
managed competition. 4 An anti-kickback safe harbor covers
sales of practices to physicians but not sales to hospitals. In a
letter to the IRS, the Chief Counsel to the Inspector General,
D. McCarty Thornton, identified factors related to hospital ac-
quisition of group practices and physician employment believed
to be disguised inducement. 65 In a footnote, Thornton com-
mented that the employee safe harbor protected only the com-
pensation received for covered services. 6  While Thornton has
criticized providers for overreacting to the letter, he also has
acknowledged that the HHS arguments for limits on the em-
ployment exception are less than clear.67
Given the present industry turbulence, the untimeliness of
the regulatory process presents additional problems for provid-
ers. The rulemaking process is sluggish, despite congressional
determinations that HHS promulgate timely anti-kickback safe
harbors and self-referral implementation regulations." HHS
62. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,981 (1991) (commenting on regulations codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 1001).
63. Wiehl, supra note 16, at 936. This trend has been criticized for creating organi-
zational structures that are more complex than necessary and for redistributing wealth and
control from independent professionals to corporate bureaucracies. Frankford, supra note
45, at 1913-18.
64. See infra part IV.B.3 (discussing hospital acquisitions of physician practices).
65. Letter to IRS from HHS IG Official Regarding Hospital Acquisitions of Physi-
cian Practices (Dec. 22, 1992), reprinted in 2 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 244 (Mar.
25, 1993) [hereinafter Thornton Letter].
66. Id. at 245, n.2.
67. HHS Official Tempers Agency Position of Acquisition of Physician Practices,
Health Care Daily (BNA) (Apr. 9, 1993), available in WESTLAW, 4/9/93 HCD.
68. See King, supra note 31, at 670 (noting the delays in anti-kickback rulemaking).
See also S. REP. No. 109, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 27 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 682, 707-08 (noting that the statutory language created uncertainty among
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does not have the authority for an advisory opinion mechanism
to allow providers to obtain prospective agency determinations
on proposed transactions.6 9 While the OIG planned to issue in-
terpretive rules explaining conflicts between safe harbors and
providing general guidance,70 no such guidance has been
presented, and providers must rely on the current regulatory
scheme and publicly known agency prosecutorial priorities. 1
As a result, providers need a process for prospective determina-
tion of compliance with anti-kickback laws similar to the advi-
sory opinion process provided by the IRS and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC). 2
During the 1980s, provider attempts to rationalize the cha-
otic and disorganized health care system with joint venture,
service, and lease agreements were ineffective in solving deliv-
ery problems.7 a Further, provider joint ventures with a legiti-
mate purpose of promoting health or improving the delivery
system, such as many integrated delivery systems, are arguably
different from technology that tends toward overutilization
such as MRI, CT, and physical therapy. As a result, providers
are seeking more effective delivery structures. 4
providers and required the HHS Secretary to promulgate safe harbors). Final self-referral
regulations have yet to be published. Proposed self-referral rules are included on the 1995
HHS regulatory agenda, although a publication date has not been set. See 59 Fed. Reg.
57,059, 57,076 (1994) (notifying the public of the HHS regulatory agenda).
69. Despite receiving comments that an advisory opinion mechanism would provide
guidance to the industry, decrease illegal practices, and inform HHS of current industry
trends, HHS concluded that such a mechanism would interfere with the Justice Depart-
ment's exclusive enforcement authority over criminal prosecutions and would be impossible
to implement since a prospective determination of the motive for business transactions is
impractical. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,959 (1991) (commenting on regulations codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 1001). Instead, HHS suggested that periodic updates of the safe harbors and
OIG fraud alerts highlighting illegal conduct would be sufficient to ensure that the regula-
tions "remain practical and relevant in the face of changes in health care delivery and
payment arrangements." Id.
70. Kusserow, supra note 29, at 63.
71. The factors used by the OTG in enforcement decisions include the amount of
remuneration involved, regional workload demands, and the evidence available to establish
a violation, including cooperative witnesses. HHS Reiterates, supra note 51, at 11. For a
general discussion of the OIG enforcement process and priorities, see Kusserow, supra note
29, at 67-70.
72. See Tedrick, supra note 31, at 559. See also discussion infra notes 87, 154-56
(regarding IRS, FTC, and Justice Department prospective reviews).
73. See Peters, supra note 3, at 21-22.
74. Id.
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B. Federal Tax Exemption
Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts
charitable nonprofit organizations from federal income tax.7 5
To be eligible for exemption, section 501(c) of the Code re-
quires that an organization organize and operate exclusively for
an exempt purpose, including religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes, subject to constraints on the
distribution of profits and limits on political activities. 6 The In-
ternal Revenue Service enforces tax laws, and the primary pen-
alty for noncompliance is loss of tax exemption. The IRS re-
cently entered into a closing agreement with a tax-exempt
hospital that obligates the hospital to pay more than
$1,000,000 in penalties representing the hospital's federal in-
come tax liability had it been taxable.
Rationales for tax exemption are much disputed, yet none
of the theoretical frameworks provide a comprehensive ration-
ale. 8 One of the oldest and most conventional theories, the
subsidy-based theory, views tax exemption as a quid pro quo
for the relief of governmental burdens.79 Hansmann's capital
75. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1988). Qualified charitable organizations also are entitled to
receive tax deductible donor contributions, I.R.C. § 170(a), (c) (1988), and to issue bonds
with tax-exempt investor income. I.R.C. §§ 103, 141(e)(1)(g) (1988).
76. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). Exempt organizations must satisfy a two-part test to
meet the exclusivity requirement of § 501(c)(3). Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(I) (as
amended in 1990). The organizational test requires the charter to be limited to one or more
exempt purposes and not empower the organization to engage, otherwise than as an insub-
stantial part of its activities, in activities not in furtherance of an exempt purpose and
requires the assets to be dedicated to exempt purposes. Treas. Reg. § !.501(c)(3)-1(b) (as
amended in 1990). The operational test requires that the organization primarily engage in
activities directed toward accomplishment of its exempt purpose. If more than an insub-
stantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of its exempt purpose or if the net earn-
ings of the organization inure to private individuals, the organization will fail the opera-
tional test. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(I) (as amended in 1990).
77. See Closing Agreement Raises Questions About Wider Application of Restric-
tions, 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1531 (Oct. 27, 1994). Tax liability may be
considerable for nonprofit hospitals that lose their exemption given that the value of federal
tax exemption, including income tax, tax-exempt bonds, and deductible donor contribu-
tions, is estimated at 4.1% of net revenues. See Bradford Gray, Why Nonprofits? Hospi-
tals and the Future of American Health Care, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 729, 731 (1992).
Exemptions from state and local governments also have become the subject of increased
scrutiny and account for an additional 3.7 % of net revenues. Id.
78. Gray, supra note 77, at 734 (arguing that one reason any principled rationale for
tax exemption is "up for grabs" is that tax policy accumulates separate policy decisions
made by disparate political bodies over time); Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corpo-
rations, Tax Exemption, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1612-14 (1992).
79. Gray, supra note 77, at 734. See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (relying upon a subsidy theory to uphold the IRS revocation of ex-
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compensation theory is based on the economic rationale that
prohibitions on profit distributions will protect nonprofit organi-
zation consumers against contract failure where, as with health
care, they may be vulnerable and have difficulty evaluating the
quality of complex personal services they receive.80 In his view,
tax exemption compensates nonprofit organizations for the non-
distribution constraint and resulting lack of access to equity
markets.8' Atkinson's altruism theory argues that donors may
want to subsidize the "metabenefit" of diversity and pluralism
in the provision of goods and services by providers who forego
profits."2 The donative theory of tax exemption argued by Hall
and Colombo states that exemptions should be limited to chari-
table organizations able to demonstrate sufficient community
support through philanthropic contributions.8 3 A much broader
view taken from the law of charitable trusts broadly defines
charity as a gift "for the benefit of an indefinite number of
persons ... by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or
constraints"'" and supports the idea that the provision of health
care is charitable per se. A modern twist on the per se theory is
Gray's argument that health care is unique, and tax exemption
simply represents a political preference for the nonprofit
empt status from a racially discriminatory private school); Utah County v. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 267 (Utah 1985) (relying upon a subsidy theory to revoke
the state property tax exemption of two hospitals).
The corollary to the subsidy theory, the tax expenditure doctrine, holds that the gov-
ernment may bestow or withhold privileges in exchange for any condition. Gray, supra note
77, at 730. Problems with the subsidy theory are that it does not explain why more direct,
efficient subsidies should not be granted nor why for-profit organizations should not be
exempted. Id. at 734. Moreover, the subsidy rationale results in substantive policy decision-
making by ill-equipped tax committees and the IRS. Developments in the Law, supra note
78, at 1621.
80. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 497, 504-07 (1981) (defining prohibitions on profit distributions as the "nondistribu-
tion constraint").
81. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L. J. 54, 72 (1981). See also Henry
Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:
A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 27, 29-33 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) (discussing the contract
failure theory).
82. See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REv. 501,
605 (1990).
83. See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit
Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 316, 390
(1991).
84. G. BoGERT. TRusTS § 54 (6th ed. 1987). But see Hall & Colombo, supra note
83, at 338-40 (criticizing the application of charitable trust law to tax exemption).
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form.8 5 Finally, both Marmor and Seay have described a utili-
tarian role of tax exemption in encouraging development of cer-
tain types of institutions.86
The tax-exemption enforcement process is much more flex-
ible and adaptive than anti-kickback and self-referral enforce-
ment. One advantage that the IRS has over HHS in providing
clarity to providers is that, besides regulations, the IRS pub-
lishes revenue rulings, revenue procedures, private letter rul-
ings, and General Counsel Memorandums (GCMs).87 These
documents are publicly available and give guidance to provid-
ers considering similar transactions.88 The IRS recently pub-
lished an article on integrated delivery system tax-exemption
requirements that provides unparalleled guidance on current
agency positions.89
Further, the IRS recognizes the importance of identifying
and addressing the evolving organizational structures in health
care. The IRS is considering a centralized determination pro-
cess and increased use of revenue rulings to address these issues
promptly at a national level.90 To improve tax law enforcement,
85. See Gray, supra note 77, at 737-38 (distinguishing the health care exemption
rationale from more principled theories due to the role of government as a major pur-
chaser, the problems of contract failure despite third party monitoring of quality, the evi-
dence that nonprofit hospitals do not follow economic incentives as closely as for-profits,
and the decreased need for purchasers to monitor fraud and abuse).
86. See Theodore R. Marmor et al., A New Look at Nonprofits: Health Care Policy
in a Competitive Age, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 324, n.50 (1986); J. David Seay, Tax-
exemption for Hospitals: Towards an Understanding of Community Benefits, 2 HEALTH
MATRIX 35, 36, 38 (1992).
87. Revenue Rulings (Rev. Rul.) are weekly publications that provide guidance re-
garding the IRS application of law limited to certain facts. Revenue Procedures (Rev.
Proc.) announce IRS practices and procedures. Private letter rulings, or determination let-
ters, allow providers to request and receive advice on specific transactions. General Counsel
Memorandums (GCMs) usually provide detailed legal analysis and conclusions in connec-
tion with IRS positions developed from private letter rulings and revenue rulings. The IRS
also publishes a notice of acquiescence or non-acquiescence to indicate whether or not it
will accept a Tax Court ruling unfavorable to the IRS. I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM TEXTBOOK
115, 120-21 (1987).
88. See Tommy F. Thompson, The Unadministrability of the Federal Charitable
Tax Exemption: Causes, Effects, & Remedies, 5 VA. TAX REV. 1, 6-7 (1985).
89. See IRS 1994 TEXTBOOK, supra note 20. The article discusses the legal stan-
dards for community benefit, private benefit, and private inurement. Id. at 224-32. Accord-
ing to the IRS, this article and recent determination letters best illustrate current IRS
policies. T.J. Sullivan, Current Developments in Tax Exempt Health Care, C875 A LI.-
A.B.A. SEC. ON TAX 187, 212 (1993).
90. IRS Looking into Centralizing Determination Letter Process, 3 Health L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 6, at 195 (Feb. 10, 1994).
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the Treasury Department also has proposed a reexamination of
sanctions and the development of statutory alternatives to loss
of tax exemption."' Intermediate sanctions, including taxation
or monetary penalties, will reduce the risk of loss of tax exemp-
tion while ensuring that unlawful activity is penalized.
Although the IRS has been somewhat supportive of inte-
grated delivery system development, it also is challenged by the
abundance of new delivery and financing models. Industry crit-
icism has revolved around the lengthy and extensive prepara-
tion needed to comply with what are being interpreted as de
facto standards, 92 the application of hospital-oriented standards
to the newer models of delivery, 93 and the restraints on physi-
cian roles that may alienate physicians in the operation of inte-
grated delivery systems.94 More generally, several commenta-
tors have questioned the suitability of the IRS in establishing
health policy95 and enforcing health care laws. 96
The initial IRS determination letters relating to integrated
delivery systems focused on foundation-model integrated deliv-
ery systems. 97 The IRS analyzed the factors traditionally used
91. Sullivan, supra note 89, at 194. Congressman Stark introduced a bill establishing
intermediate sanction authority through excise taxes on private inurement. See H.R. 3697,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
92. Peters, Practical Examination, supra note 43, at 765 (stating that deviations are
probably fruitless and may lead to exemption revocation).
93. John D. Colombo, Health Care Reform and Federal Tax Exemption: Rethink-
ing the Issues, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 215, 247-48 (1994) (noting the inapplicability of
hospital community benefit criteria and proposing the consideration of a new exemption
standard); Elizabeth M. Mills & Jennifer F. Skeels, Tailoring Traditional Hospital Tax-
exemption Tests for New Integrated Health Care Systems, 10 Healthspan (P-H L. &
Bus.) No. 5, at 3 (May, 1993) (arguing that the IRS should be persuaded to adapt the
hospital community benefit standard to conform to integrated delivery realities).
94. Peters, Practical Examination, supra note 43, at 765-66. The integrated delivery
system determination letters also have been criticized because the models approved by the
IRS reduce the equity incentive for physician efficiency and decrease physician autonomy.
See Harris Meyer, Foundation Model for Medical Groups Passes IRS Test, AM. MED.
NEWS, Mar. 15, 1993, at 3, 11 (noting that the Friendly Hills physicians lost considerable
autonomy and disgruntled physicians are investigating alternate practice arrangements).
95. See John D. Colombo & Mark A. Hall, The Future of Tax-Exemption for Non-
profit Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 31-33 (1992);
Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Tax Administration as Health Policy: Hospitals,
the Internal Revenue Service, and the Courts, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 251, 277-78
(1991).
96. See Kenneth L. Levine, IRS Enforcement of Health Care Laws, 6 EXEMPT ORG.
TAX RE v. 921, 928 (1992)(arguing that the IRS need not condition tax exemption on com-
pliance with anti-kickback laws). See also infra note 293.
97. See Harriman Jones Medical Foundation, reprinted in 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 719 (1994) (foundation model sponsored by regional health care system to acquire
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to evaluate hospital exemptions and applied the hospital "com-
munity benefit" standard.98 The hospital factors the IRS ap-
plied to integrated delivery systems focused on limits to physi-
cian participation on the integrated system board, the provision
of charity and emergency care, participation in Medicare and
Medicaid, reasonable compensation to the physician group,
medical education and research, open medical staff require-
ments, and the purchase of medical group assets at a fair mar-
ket value.99
The controversy in integrated delivery system tax policy
surrounding the role of physicians in the integrated system re-
volves around private benefit and private inurement concerns.
Exempt organizations must be operated for a public rather
than a private purpose and not serve private interests. 100 Pri-
medical group for outpatient service expansion); Facey Medical Foundation, reprinted in 7
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 828 (1993) (foundation model sponsored by a regional health care
system to acquire medical groups); Friendly Hills Healthcare Network, reprinted in 7 Ex-
EMPT ORG. TAX REv. 490 (1993) (foundation model sponsored by academic medical
center) [hereinafter integrated delivery system determination letters].
The foundation model is a creative attempt by hospitals to circumvent state corporate
practice of medicine statutes by establishing a nonprofit corporation that purchases the
assets of formerly taxable medical practices and then contracts with the medical group to
provide professional services to managed care populations. Robert S. Bromberg, The Foun-
dation Model, 8 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 335, 335-36 (1993).
98. See Colombo, supra note 93, at 240. The IRS has developed the community
benefit standard through revenue rulings over the last several decades. The original test
required indigent care to the extent of the hospital's financial ability. Rev. Rul. 56-185,
1956-I C.B. 202. Rev. Rul. 69-545 relaxed this requirement and allowed an alternate com-
munity benefit test based on facts and circumstances. Community benefit factors included
a full-time emergency room available without regard to ability to pay, Medicare and Medi-
caid participation, a community board, an open medical staff, and the return of profits to
the hospital facility. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. In 1983, the IRS determined that
emergency facilities were not required if community needs were already met or in specialty
hospitals, such as cancer or eye hospitals, that are unlikely to provide emergency care. Rev.
Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
99. For in-depth criticisms concerning the appropriateness of applying each of these
factors to integrated delivery systems, see Bromberg, supra note 97, at 347-42; Peter N.
Grant, IRS Approves Exemption for Medical Group Practices in Integrated Delivery Sys-
tem, 5 J. TAX'N EXEMPT ORG. 3, 5-6 (1993).
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1990) (stating that the
organization must demonstrate that it is not "organized and operated for the benefit of
private interests"). Public benefit is based on common law principles that a charitable or-
ganization benefit a class adequately charitable. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as
amended in 1990). Traditionally charitable classes such as the poor and underprivileged
are enumerated in the regulations. Id. Alternatively, common law notions of charity may
encompass benefits to a broad, indefinite public. See Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. 158, 178 (1978), acq., 1981-2 C.B. 1. Private benefits must be incidental to public
benefits and pass a two-part test to be incidental. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Dec. 8,
1986). A private benefit is qualitatively incidental if the public benefit can be conferred
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vate inurement is a subset of private benefit and is prohibited
by the statute and the regulations.10 1 The private inurement
prohibition is analogous to the nondistribution constraint and
applies to "insiders" who exploit their position by influencing or
controlling the distribution of net earnings. 0 2 Physician repre-
sentation in integrated delivery system governance has invoked
private benefit concerns while physician compensation has in-
voked private inurement concerns.103
The IRS limits physician membership to 20% of the gov-
erning board of an integrated delivery systems. 0 4 The rationale
only by conferring a private benefit, and a private benefit is quantitatively incidental if the
public benefit outweighs an insubstantial private benefit. Id.
101. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). Exempt organizations are those
entities "no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). If the net earnings of the organization
inure to private individuals, the organization will fail the operational test. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(I) (as amended in 1990). See also IRS 1994 TEXTBOOK, supra note
20, at 231 (discussing the IRS view on the differences between private inurement and
private benefit).
102. BRUCE R. HOPKINS. THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 12.2 (5th
ed. 1987) (stating that insiders include founders, directors and officers, and contributors).
While net earnings are not simply limited to dividend distributions, Harding Hosp. v.
United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1974), a reasonable compensation exception
allows payments to insiders if the entire amount is reasonable in relation to the services
provided, Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Apr. 24, 1986), comparable in cost to services negoti-
ated at arms length from an outsider, and not merely a disguised profit distribution. See
University of Mass. Medical Sch. Group Practice v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1299 (1980),
acq., 1980-2 C.B. 2 (reversing an IRS denial of tax exemption to a faculty practice plan
because the compensation was reasonable and subject to great public scrutiny and outside
control); B.H.W. Anesthesia Found. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 681 (1979), nonacq., 1980-2
C.B. 2 (finding salaries of the Harvard Medical School anesthesiology group reasonable
considering the nature of the work and the required skills). However,
[w]here a doctor or group of doctors dominate the affairs of a corporate hospital
otherwise exempt from tax, the courts have closely scrutinized the underlying rela-
tionship to insure that the arrangements permit a conclusion that the corporate
hospital is organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes without any
private inurement.
Lowery Hosp. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 850, 859 (1976) (finding private inurement
where the founding physicians so controlled the hospital that there was no line of demarca-
tion between their private medical practice and the hospital). In Lowery, the defendant
physicians had argued that a symbiotic relationship between the clinic practice and the
hospital created mutual benefits. The court did not hold that a such a union would not be
exempt, but held that "when it is predicated on the comprehensive integration of the two
organisms, [the exempt organization] must offer convincing proof that the benefits were not
unevenly distributed in favor of the private parties involved." Id. at 860 n.1 1.
Courts also have found private inurement where founding physicians exerted a virtual
monopoly over hospital patients allowing private benefits to inure. Harding Hospital, 505
F.2d at 1078.
103. See IRS 1994 TEXTBOOK, supra note 20, at 227-32.
104. See id. at 227. According to the IRS, the key issue in the determination letters
was the balancing of private benefit to physician members against the public benefit of
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for this position is that the agreements with physicians to pro-
vide professional services for the patients of the integrated sys-
tem and the physicians' prior ownership of practice assets cre-
ate a strong presumption of private benefit. 10 5 However, this
presumption has been subject to trenchant criticism for its lack
of a statutory basis, its unenforceability, and its lack of appre-
ciation for current realities.'0 6
In analyzing private inurement, the IRS presumes that
physicians are insiders,10 7 but this interpretation also has been
severely criticized. 0 8 Nonetheless, the IRS assumes that any
physician in the medical group providing professional services
to an integrated delivery system is presumptively an insider.' 0 9
The IRS will examine the potential for inurement, but the in-
sider presumption may be overcome if each physician does not
have a "chance to employ inside influence."" 0 The IRS pre-
sumption effectively limits physician representation on an inte-
grated system's compensation and fee committees to avoid po-
tential inurement risks."' The problem with imposing such
limitations is that they prevent the "possibility of inurement"
rather than the statutory prohibition of actual inurement, and
appropriate safeguards can be developed to allow physician
participation without creating an inurement problem. 12
creating an integrated delivery system. Marlis L. Carlson, Sullivan: Geisinger Case Impor-
tant for All Types of Health Care Providers, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv 893, 893 (1993).
105. IRS 1994 TEXTBOOK, supra note 20, at 227.
106. See Colombo, supra note 93, at 241-42; Grant, supra note 99, at 5; Peters,
Practical Examination, supra note 43, at 765. Peters argues that the IRS criteria for de-
termining integrated delivery system tax exemption are likely to be challenged because
courts are not likely to uphold the application of criteria that was established for tax-
exempt financing, not tax exemption in general. Id. The limits also conflict with integrated
delivery objectives of improving health delivery through physician partnerships. Id. Fur-
ther, the limits attack the possibility of inurement, while the statute prohibits actual inure-
ment. Id.
107. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
108. See Colombo, supra note 93, at 241 (noting that the IRS position on physician
control is based on its "historic paranoia about exempting entities that could benefit doc-
tors"); Theodore T. Myre, Jr., Significant Tax Issues in Hospital Related Joint Ventures,
75 Ky. L. 559, 577-79 (1986).
109. IRS 1994 TEXTBOOK, supra note 20, at 231-32.
110. Id.
11I. See Peters, Practical Examination, supra note 43, at 767.
112. Id. (recommending that integrated delivery system boards use physicians only
in an advisory capacity and use outside expertise to validate the physician compensation
plan). See also infra note 183.
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Like the anti-kickback law, tax law has been interpreted
around the fundamental assumptions of a vanishing fee-for-ser-
vice industry. In Lorain Avenue Clinic v. Commissioner, the
court found private inurement and private benefit in the physi-
cian control over hospital policies because the physician com-
pensation plan allowed competing physicians to set their own
fees individually and was akin to the practice of medicine in a
fee-for-service system.11 Unlike fee-for-service, physician com-
pensation in an integrated delivery system is based on incen-
tives for cost-effective delivery. Integrated systems need physi-
cian expertise to design appropriate cost-effective
arrangements, but the integrated delivery system board should
set individual physician compensation. 1 4
The IRS bases its presumption of physician control over
health care institutions on assumptions of professional domi-
nance in hospitals that are outmoded. Economic regulation of
hospitals, hospital legal liability for quality care, and the ascent
of professional hospital administrators have shifted the model
of hospital decision making away from a "physicians' coopera-
tive" toward a model of shared authority among hospital con-
stituents.115 As a result, no single profession predominates the
modern hospital, and widespread group participation is neces-
sary for effective decision making. 16 Further, due to the declin-
ing number of hospitals, the increasing number of physicians,
and the constraints that managed care places on access to pa-
tients, physicians are becoming bound to particular hospitals.117
The IRS emphasis on minor private benefit is overstated
when balanced against the public benefit of integrated delivery
systems and the role of these systems in the modern managed
113. Lorain Ave. Clinic v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 141, 159 (1958).
114. Peters, Practical Examination, supra note 43, at 766.
115. Compare Stephen M. Shortell, Physician Involvement in Hospital Decision
Making, in THE NEw HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPET-
ITIvE ENVIRONMENT 73, 83-86 (Bradford H. Gray ed., 1983) with VICTOR FUCHS. WHO
SHALL LIVE?: HEALTH. ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE 56-78 (1974) (discussing physi-
cian dominance as the "captain of the team") and Mark Pauly & Michael Redisch, The
Not-for-Profit Hospital as a Physicians' Cooperative, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 87, 88 (1973)
(assuming that physicians exercise de facto control over hospitals).
116. Shortell, supra note 115, at 74.
117. COMM. ON IMPLICATIONS OF FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE. INST.
OF MEDICINE. FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 174 (Bradford H. Gray ed.,
1986) (discussing the changing nature of physician influence in hospitals).
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care environment.' 18 Resourceful hospitals with large capital
reserves, refined marketing strategies, and sophisticated law-
yers may take advantage of the fears that isolated physicians
have of market exclusion and health reform uncertainties. 19
Some hospitals also use the ambiguity surrounding private in-
urement and private benefit to extract lower prices from physi-
cians selling their practices. 2 ° Instead, integrated delivery sys-
tems should be partnerships between hospitals and physicians
to provide resources and expertise that improve delivery sys-
tems. 1 21 Otherwise, fragmentation of service delivery will
continue.
Finally, tax policy must be flexible toward evolving non-
profit forms or consumers will be left with only for-profit deliv-
ery choices. For-profit entities do not have the same restrictions
on physician involvement in integrated delivery system develop-
ment. In competitive managed care markets, many physicians
are embracing the acquisition strategies of for-profit companies
to obtain new patients, job security, and ownership interests.12 2
While both investor-owned acquisitions and nonprofit hospital
acquisitions are subject to the anti-kickback, self-referral, and
antitrust laws, tax exemption is a crucial issue for the nonprofit
hospital.123
Shared governance and decision making are appropriate
under the risk-sharing realities of integrated delivery sys-
tems,1 24 and nonprofit entities are unnecessarily restricted from
designing mechanisms that allow a reasonable level of physi-
cian autonomy and control. The result may be either the con-
version to for-profit forms or the creation of nonprofit forms
limiting physician participation, producing physician disillu-
118. A similar criticism has been noted in relation to tax policy on hospital and
physician joint ventures. See Kurt A. Wagner, Commentary, Federal Income Taxation of
Nonprofit Hospital Joint Ventures, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 479, 495-96 (1993).
119. Sandra Breisch & Julie Johnsson, Hospitals are Gobbling up Practices: Should
You Sell? AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 27, 1993, at 15, 15.
120. Id.
121. Peters, Practical Examination, supra note 43, at 766.
122. David R. Olmos, The Rough Road to Health Care Reform - Physicians: Many
California Doctors Afraid of Being Squeezed Out by HMOs under Clinton's Health Plan
are Selling Their Practices to Investor-owned 'Super-Groups, LA TIMES, Sept. 27, 1993,
at Dl.
123. Donna Vavala, Medical Practices: Hot Properties of the 90s, PHYSICIAN EXEC-
UTIVE, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 40.
124. Julie Johnsson, IRS Guide on Tax Exemptions: Guidelines Detail Rules on
Physician Involvement in Integrated Delivery, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 4, 1993, at 3, 35.
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sionment, and causing physicians to take advantage of the in-
vestor-owned appetite for physician practices. Again, federal
regulatory efforts to control provider behavior may produce un-
intended consequences when applied under the new health care
paradigm.
C. Federal Antitrust Laws
The primary rationale for federal antitrust laws is to foster
and protect competition under the presumption that open mar-
kets enhance consumer welfare. 1 5 This Note focuses primarily
on section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibiting contracts, combi-
nations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. 12 6 Section 1 gov-
erns many of the contracts and combinations that form the ba-
sis of integrated delivery systems development.
Congressional intent for section 1 is confusing because
"restraint of trade" is ambiguous and the statute does not ad-
dress whose interests the law is designed to protect. While
courts have at times protected various political, social, and eco-
nomic interests, the prevailing view is that the goal of antitrust
law is to maximize consumer welfare as judged by the criteria
of economic efficiency.1 28
125. See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust. Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020, 1023, 1035 (1987) (defin-
ing the economic goals of antitrust law). See also Northern Pac. Ry. V. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958); ROBERT H. BORK. THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978).
126. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Courts have interpreted § I to pro-
hibit only "unreasonable restraints." See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Reazin v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 956 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S.
1005 (1990). Other federal antitrust laws include § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1988) (prohibiting monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopo-
lize), the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988) (governing price discrimination),
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988) (prohibiting mergers and acquisitions which sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend toward monopoly), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988) (prohibit-
ing exclusive dealing and tying arrangements that substantially lessen competition) and the
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988) (governing unfair methods of competition that restrict
market structures).
127. Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Anti-
trust Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 241, 243 (1987).
128. See BORK, supra note 125, at 55-66 (arguing that the statutory language and
legislative history of the Sherman Act indicate a single congressional intent to maximize
consumer welfare); Frank N. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv.
1696, 1698 n.7 (1986) (noting that antitrust jurisprudence emphasizes economic efficiency
and consumer welfare).
19951
HEALTH MATRIX
Antitrust analysis is inherently fact-specific and involves a
two-pronged analysis. If the purpose of the agreement is likely
to restrict competition or decrease output, courts will apply a
per se analysis 12 9 and will strike such agreements as illegal per
se, despite any procompetitive benefits. 130 Relevant exceptions
to the per se rule include joint ventures that incorporate risk
sharing 3 or agreements to integrate that produce otherwise
unobtainable benefits such as the production of a new socially
useful product or a decrease in costs. 13 2
Courts consider agreements that are not per se illegal
under a "rule of reason" analysis.' 33 After defining the relevant
geographic and product market, courts will evaluate the pur-
pose of the agreement and the anticompetitive effects and
procompetitive benefits of the agreement.' The anticompeti-
tive effects and the procompetitive benefits are then balanced to
determine whether the restraint is reasonable. 3 5 Finally, the
court will evaluate agreements ancillary to the main agreement
to detect any illegitimate restrictions on competition.3 6 Rele-
129. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927). A per
se analysis is generally used for price fixing, market division, and certain group boycotts
and tying arrangements. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5. See also Craig D. Bachman,
Per Se Offenses, in ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE: ENFORCEMENT AND ANALYSIS 3, 3 (M.
Elizabeth McGee ed., 1992) [hereinafter ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE].
130. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 351; Northern Pacific Ry., 356 U.S. at 5; United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224, n.59 (1940). See also FTC v. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462-63 (1986) (holding that quality of care was not a
defense to anticompetitive conduct under a rule of reason analysis).
131. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356 (applying a per se analysis to a maximum fee
schedule agreement among PPO network physicians with inadequate risk sharing).
132. This defense is also known as the "new product doctrine." Wiehl, supra note
16, at 928. See also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 101
(1984) (applying a rule of reason analysis to NCAA exclusive network agreements because
horizontal restraints were necessary to market college football); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1979) (applying a rule of reason analysis to licensing agreements
among competitors which produced a new product). But see Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 351
(finding that a PPO product was not unique).
133. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
691-92 (1978); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
134. See Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692; Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at
238.
135. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
136. See id. at 50-51; Robert J. Enders, An Introduction to Special Antitrust Issues
in Health Care Provider Joint Ventures, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 805, 821-24 (1993) (discuss-
ing ancillary restraints such as provider exclusion through selective provider participation,
provider and payor exclusive participation in a network, and restraints on dealing with
nonparticipating providers).
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vant exemptions3 7 from federal antitrust law include the busi-
ness of insurance,'138 regulatory immunity,3 9 state action, 40 the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986,111 and the po-
litical action exemption. 42
137. For a discussion of exemptions common to the health care industry, see gener-
ally Martin J. Thompson & Samuel Hirsch, Exemptions and Immunities, in ANTITRUST
HEALTH CARE, supra note 129, at 25.
138. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(b), 1013(b) (1988). The act ex-
empts conduct that is part of the "business of insurance" to the extent it is regulated by
state law unless boycotts, coercion, or intimidation are involved. Ocean State Physician
Health Plan v. Blue Cross, 883 F.2d 1101, 1107 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1027 (1990) (interpreting the McCarran-Ferguson Act). The business of insurance encom-
passes practices within the insurance industry that effect a transfer of risk and directly
involve the insurer and insured policy relationship. Id. (interpreting Union Labor Life Ins.
v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982), to hold that a Blue Cross managed care product was
covered under McCarran-Ferguson and exempt from antitrust scrutiny due to the nature of
its marketing and pricing conduct). See also Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug,
440 U.S. 205, 214 (1979), reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979) (providing a narrow interpre-
tation of "the business of insurance" in a price-fixing agreement between Blue Cross and
pharmacies).
139. This exemption is also known as "implied repeal" and protects activity that is
required to comply with federal directives. See Bloch & Falk, supra note 11, at 220. How-
ever, this defense is not favored by courts and requires a "clear repugnancy between the
antitrust laws and the regulatory system." National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr.
v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 393 (1981) (holding that federal health planning laws did not
immunize Blue Cross from antitrust scrutiny). See also Silver v. New York Stock Exch.,
373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963), reh'g denied, 375 U.S. 870 (1964). Thus, health care reform
legislation would not provide an implied exemption unless explicitly recognized by the stat-
ute. However, several health reform proposals have called for express antitrust immunities.
Robert E. Bloch & Donald M. Falk, Bids for Sweeping Antitrust Exemptions, Sought by
Health Care Providers, Could Prove Poor Medicine for Consumers, NAT'L L.J. Jan. 24,
1994, at 27.
140. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (immunizing conduct mandated
by state law). See also FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2176 (1992) (requir-
ing state action to be active and participatory); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (requiring that the conduct clearly re-
flect state policy and be subject to active supervision by the state). See also Bloch & Falk,
supra note 11, at 220.
141. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152
(1988) (providing peer review committees with a qualified immunity from antitrust laws).
Peer review activities must be conducted with a reasonable effort to obtain relevant facts,
with the reasonable belief that they are warranted by the facts and further quality care,
and with adequate procedural due process protections. See id. § 11112(a). Immunity does
not apply to actions brought by the Justice Department or state attorney generals. Id.
§ 11111.
142. This exemption is also known as the "Noerr-Pennington Doctrine" and protects
political and lobbying activities intended to influence governmental policies. See United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 138-40 (1961). An exception for "sham activity" al-
lows antitrust scrutiny where the activity is a sham to disguise illegitimate conduct against
a competitor. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972).
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Antitrust laws are enforced by the Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department, the FTC, and private parties. 143  As
with anti-kickback law, a violation of the antitrust laws may
result in both criminal sanctions1 44 and substantial civil penal-
ties. 1 45 However, criminal liability requires proof of anticompe-
titive intent.1 46
Since most joint provider activity is evaluated under a rule
of reason analysis,1 47 the primary concerns with antitrust com-
pliance are the ambiguity of the analysis, 48 the need for de-
tailed justification,'149 and the risk of treble damages. While the
Supreme Court has recently decided a significant number of
health care antitrust cases,1 50 few integrated delivery systems
transactions have been challenged.1 51 Antitrust has been less of
a barrier to integrated delivery systems development than have
other federal laws due to agency guidance and reasoned en-
forcement.1 52 In fact, one FTC official asserts "[m]anaged care
owes its existence to effective antitrust enforcement" due to an
143. The Justice Department enforces the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. The
FTC enforces the Clayton Act and the FTC Act. Private parties injured by anticompetitive
conduct may also bring actions under Clayton Act § 4. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
144. Id. §§ 1, 2.
145. Damages are trebled for civil violations. Id. § 15.
146. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978). For
a discussion of criminal antitrust enforcement in health care, see generally Toby G. Singer
& Helen-Louise Hunter, Criminal Investigation and Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws in
the Health Care Field, 2 ANNALS HEALTH L. 67 (1993).
147. Robert E. Bloch, Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Field: A Report
from the Department of Justice, in ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 129, at 169,
172. Presumably, the reason is that most joint provider activity is not by its nature an-
ticompetitive. Most antitrust cases in the health care industry have been subjected to a rule
of reason analysis, Douglas C. Ross, Rule of Reason Analysis: The "Quality" Defense in
Health Care Cases, in ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 129, at 13, 13, but agree-
ments among providers to engage in presumptively anticompetitive conduct, such as price
fixing, will not escape a per se analysis. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 348.
148. Wiehl, supra note 16, at 924.
149. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343.
150. Robert J. Enders, Alternative Delivery Systems, in ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE,
supra note 129, at 195, 196.
151. See NHLA Seminar Predicts Increase in Federal Probes and Focus on Key
Issues, 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1693, at 697 (Dec. 15, 1994) (noting
however that investigations may increase). See also Singer & Hunter, supra note 146, at
67 (noting the increased enforcement of the antitrust laws in health care generally).
152. Schermer & Owens, supra note 28, at 26 (arguing that antitrust laws are less
threatening than anti-kickback and self-referral laws due to Justice Department guidance
and reasoned enforcement).
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agency focus on keeping markets open for the development of
alternate plans. 153
Like the IRS, the Justice Department and the FTC have
mechanisms other than regulations that provide prospective
guidance to providers. In response to provider requests, the Jus-
tice Department will provide a business review letter stating its
current enforcement intentions. 5 The FTC provides similar
guidance through advisory opinions. 55 Business review letters
and advisory opinions are then publicly available for other
providers seeking guidance. 56
Additionally, both agencies issue "guidelines" that outline
agency positions on antitrust analysis and enforcement. In try-
ing to reduce uncertainty among providers, the Justice Depart-
ment and the FTC developed policy statements in 1993 that
afford safety zone protection in six areas: hospital mergers,
joint ventures among hospitals for the provision of high-tech-
nology, collective provision of information to payors by physi-
cians, hospital exchanges of price and cost information, pro-
vider joint purchasing, and physician-controlled networks. 57
Within a year of developing the policy statements, the antitrust
enforcement agencies issued nine additional statements that ex-
pand upon the 1993 guidelines and also provide analytical prin-
ciples used in analyzing multi-provider networks. 5 8 Except for
153. Federal Agencies Set to Stay Course Pending Outcome of Health Care Re-
form, Health Care Daily (BNA) (May 24, 1993), available in WESTLAW, 5/24/93
HCD (quoting Mark J. Horoschak); David L. Meyer & Charles F. (Rick) Rule, Health
Care Collaboration Dots Not Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 169, 170-71 (1994). See also Reazin, 899 F.2d at 963 (upholding a § I antitrust
violation by Blue Cross as anticompetitive because it inhibited alternative delivery system
development and reduced consumer options).
154. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1994) (detailing Justice Department business review
procedures). The Justice Department also has developed a pilot expedited business review
program for joint ventures and exchange of business information. See Pilot Business Re-
view Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 6132 (1993).
155. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.3 (1994) (detailing FTC advisory opinion procedures).
156. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1994) (Justice Department business review letters); 16
C.F.R. § 1.4 (1994) (FTC advisory opinions).
157. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N. STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN THE HEALTH CARE AREA (Sept. 15, 1993) [hereinafter 1993
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES].
158. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N. STATEMENTS OF ENFORCEMENT
POLICY AND ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST (Sept.
27, 1994), reprinted in 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1682 (Supp. Sept. 29,
1994) [hereinafter 1994 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES]. The 1994 guidelines
were issued due to the concern that many procompetitive arrangements were curtailed by
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hospital mergers and multi-provider networks, the agencies
guarantee the health care provider community expedited busi-
ness reviews and advisory opinions within ninety days of a com-
pleted application. 159
Provider networks generally will be evaluated based upon
whether the collaboration is sufficiently integrated to share sub-
stantial risk or provide a new product that differs materially
from individual activities. 160 Like the anti-kickback laws, the
Sherman Act encourages physician integration. 61 However,
given the Supreme Court finding that the economic integration
of the Maricopa PPO was insufficiently unique to afford a new
product defense, health care antitrust attorneys still struggle
with the lack of clarity in the requisite degree of integration. 162
The physician-network safety zones begin to address these
issues. Safety zone protection is afforded to exclusive ventures
if the physicians compose no greater than 20% of a specialty
area with active hospital admission privileges in the local mar-
ket and share "substantial financial risk."' 68 Similar protection
is afforded to nonexclusive ventures that compose no greater
antitrust fears. Agencies Clarify Reach of Health Care Guidelines, 67 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1682, at 357 (Sept. 29, 1994).
159. 1994 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 158, at S-5.
160. Bloch & Falk, supra note 11, at 213-14. Discounts, capitation, and new prod-
ucts such as utilization review and plan administration may be sufficient, but a fact-specific
analysis must be made into the network's purposes and its effect on competition. Id.
161. See Wiehl, supra note 16, at 923, 928. See also discussion supra notes 60-63
and surrounding text. Entities that are a part of a single enterprise are incapable of con-
spiring because Sherman § I prohibits a conspiracy or agreement among independent com-
petitors. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)
(holding that price fixing between a parent holding company and its subsidiary' was not a
conspiracy).
162. See Kevin E. Grady, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Health Care Joint
Ventures, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 765, 781-84 (discussing the inconsistencies among Justice
Department, FTC, and court opinions) (1993); J. Thomas Rosch & Hajime Tada, The
Antitrust Risks of Management Services Organizations, Medical Foundations, and Inte-
grated Delivery Systems, 20 Topics IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING 37, 44 (1994) (noting
however that the greater the provider integration, the greater the antitrust protection).
Further, the degree of market power and foreclosure of competition are other significant
questions. Id. at 44 (noting that courts are concerned that overinclusiveness of providers
may lead to market power sufficient to reduce competition and foreclose development of
alternative arrangements).
163. 1994 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 158, at S-17. Finan-
cial risks are substantial if services are provided on a capitated basis or if the members are
provided financial incentives such as a 20% withhold with distribution based upon achieve-
ment of cost containment goals. 1993 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note
157, at 35.
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than 30% of the market share and share substantial risk.16 4 A
rule of reason analysis is afforded to ventures outside the safety
zone if physicians share substantial financial risk or offer a new
product with substantial efficiencies.16 5
Nonetheless, the antitrust guidelines have been criticized
for impeding physician network development in less populated
areas, 166 inadequately protecting integrated physician efforts to
compete with insurance-sponsored alternatives,16 7 immunizing
conduct not subject to challenge,1 68 and attempting to preempt
legislative exemptions for the health care industry.1 69 While
FTC Commissioner Owen dissented from the 1993 hospital
merger guidelines as a departure from past practice and inequi-
table treatment for one industry,'70 a former Justice Depart-
ment official responsible for health care enforcement has stated
that the current turbulent environment warrants special treat-
ment of health care providers.171
The statement on multi-provider networks applies to hori-
zontal and to vertical networks such as PHOs. It sets forth only
the analytical principles the agencies will use since the agencies
have not yet obtained sufficient experience evaluating multi-
provider networks to formalize the analysis. 72 Many industry
groups reacted favorably to the 1994 guidelines despite con-
164. 1994 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 158, at S-17. See also
Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Frederick H. von Unwerth, Business Review Letter regarding National Cardiovascular
Network, Inc. (Sept. 28, 1993) (stating that the Justice Department did not intend to
challenge a national network of cardiologists and cardiovascular surgeons) (on file with
author).
165. 1994 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 158, at S-17; Letter
from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to George
Miron, Business Review Letter regarding the California Chiropractic Association (Dec. 18,
1993) (stating that the Justice Department did not intend to challenge a nonexclusive chi-
ropractic network that would allow up to 50% participation of local chiropractors) (on file
with author).
166. Steven Zoric, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Providers in the Wake of
Health Care Reform, 26 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 359, 363 (1993).
167. DOJ-FTC Clarify Antitrust "Safety Zones", HEALTH LAw. NEws REP., Oct.
1993, (Nat'l Health Lawyers Ass'n, Wash., D.C.), at 2, 3.
168. Zoric, supra note 166, at 364.
169. Id.; Thomas L. Greaney, A Critique: The Department of Justice/FTC Health
Care Policy Statements, ANTITRUST, Spring 1994, at 20, 20 (1994).
170. 1993 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 157, at Dissent, at 2,
6.
171. Zoric, supra note 166, at 364 (quoting Robert Bloch).
172. 1994 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 158, at S-21. Presum-
ably the principles would extend to physician networks and to PHOs.
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cerns that additional guidance may become necessary.Y7 a The
lack of formal advice for multi-provider networks should con-
cern PHO developers because the FTC Chairman has noted
that these networks are more likely to raise agency concerns.174
However, the Justice Department should be applauded for its
continuing attempts to solicit comments from providers under-
taking innovative transactions and for keeping current with de-
veloping delivery models.
Thus, each of these areas of federal law presents both stat-
utory and regulatory obstacles to health care industry integra-
tion efforts. The current regulatory framework is based on fun-
damental assumptions of a fee-for-service industry that
separated financing from delivery and provided incentives to in-
crease utilization of health care services. While federal agen-
cies have undertaken incremental efforts to update the regula-
tory framework for current and future realities, these laws
regulating provider behavior will require a thorough reexami-
nation as the managed competition environment unfolds.
III. INCONSISTENCIES IN APPLICATION
The patchwork approach to health policy has led to con-
cerns over special preferences and exceptions and clear incon-
sistencies in the application and enforcement of the laws gov-
erning health care providers. Despite arguments over relative
differences among organizational forms, the real debate in
health policy centers fundamentally upon the tension surround-
ing "whose interests should predominate. 17 5 While the respec-
tive agencies acknowledge these exceptions, the rationales for
distinguishing the various forms of treatment are often unclear,
unstated, or unprincipled. As the health care environment be-
173. Observers Find New DOJ/FTC Guides Offer Clearer Roadmap for Providers,
67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1683, at 390 (Oct. 6, 1994) (noting however
that the agencies plan no further revisions to the guidelines).
174. See Agencies Clarify Reach of Health Care Guidelines, supra note 158, at 357
(discussing comments by Janet D. Steiger).
175. Marmor et al., supra note 86, at 319 (arguing that the debate over relative
organizational forms should be replaced with the more important policy considerations of
the types of services to be provided, the role of physicians, and the impact of governmental
regulation on service delivery). See also Mark A. Hall, Managed Competition and Inte-
grated Health Care Delivery Systems, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 6 (1994) (noting the
power struggle among hospitals, physicians, and insurers to control integrated delivery
systems).
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comes more competitive, major players have called for efforts
to level the playing field. 17 6
A. Hospitals and Physicians
1. Referrals
Since self-referral legislation applies only to physicians,
physicians are singled out for special treatment.1 7 In this case,
the rationale is principled due to the traditional role of physi-
cians as the primary source of referrals and the conflict be-
tween physician fiduciary duties and the empirical data on self-
referral. 17 18 As a result of self-referral proscriptions, physicians
with investment interests not covered by an exception must sell
their investments, often to eagerly awaiting hospitals and
entrepreneurs. 7 9
Whether this same rationale should apply only to physi-
cians or should extend beyond the fee-for-service environment
is unclear. As insurance companies and other non-physician en-
tities begin to arrange for referrals and as incentives change to
reduce the financial benefits of overutilization by physicians,
the rationale for prohibiting physician self-referrals while al-
lowing non-physicians to refer to entities in which they have a
financial interest is open to question.
2. Tax Exemption
The "hospital paradigm" for tax exemption neglects other
components of the health care delivery system 80 and creates a
preference for hospitals as an organizational form. Most non-
profit hospitals are exempt from taxation because their charita-
ble purpose is to promote health,'8 ' but the IRS has historically
refused to extend this rationale to physician groups. 82 No legal
176. See, e.g., Greg Borzo, Leveling the Playing Field, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 14,
1994, at 2 (outlining a Blue Cross proposal for a uniform tax policy on health plans).
177. However, the entity with which the physician has a prohibited financial rela-
tionship may not bill for services covered under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(B)
(Supp. V 1993).
178. See supra note 31 and surrounding text.
179. Terese Hudson, 'Stark II' Limits Physicians, But May Help Hospitals, Hosps.
& HEALTH NETWORKS, Oct. 20, 1993, at 52.
180. Colombo & Hall, supra note 95, at 29.
181. Sullivan, supra note 89, at 197.
182. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 83, at 343 n.125 (arguing that if physicians
accept patients without regard to the ability to pay, the distinction is unfounded). See
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justification for this arbitrary distinction exists, and principled
limitations on private inurement and private benefit can be de-
veloped to maintain equity. 183
While the IRS is considering whether the "operated exclu-
sively for" requirement in the regulations may be reconciled
with group practice medical clinics having the dual purposes of
promoting health and practicing a trade or business,184 it has
recently approved two alternatives to the foundation model.
These alternatives involve formerly taxable medical groups
such as a clinic subsidiary of a hospital-based health care sys-
tem that employs physicians with privileges at hospitals within
the system 85 and a clinic that recently merged with a commu-
nity hospital under a nonprofit parent holding company. 86
These latest rulings demonstrate the IRS's willingness to move
beyond the foundation model approach to integrated delivery
systems and may indicate a willingness to reconsider its posi-
tion on group practices.
3. Antitrust
In contrast to tax exemption, anti-kickback, and self-refer-
ral laws, the recently issued antitrust guidelines protect physi-
cian control over integrated delivery systems. The new safety
generally Robert S. Bromberg, The Tax-exempt Clinic, 8 EXEMPT ORG TAX REv. 557
(1993) (discussing the difficulty that clinics have in obtaining tax exemption). Bromberg
argues that the 20% limit is unfounded for existing tax-exempt clinics because these physi-
cians relinquished substantial income and autonomy through the divestiture of property
and future profits, accepted reasonable compensation limits, and often exhibit altruistic
motives. Id. at 560.
183. See John D. Colombo, Are Associations of Doctors Tax-Exempt? Analyzing
Inconsistencies in the Tax-exemption of Health Care Providers, 9 VA. TAX REv 469, 472
(1990) (arguing that a rebuttable presumption of control test should replace the current
private benefit and private inurement analysis). Alternatively, mechanisms similar to those
used in nonprofit corporation law to protect board fiduciary obligations could be employed.
See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 8.31 (1987) (regulating di-
rector conflicts of interests).
184. Sullivan, supra note 89, at 210-11.
185. See the Detroit Medical Center exemption noted in Paul Streckfus, Clinic Op-
erator Qualifies under Section 501 (c)(3), 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 12 (1994) (exempting
a clinic subsidiary of hospital-sponsored integrated delivery system). The Detroit clinic was
previously owned and operated by a for-profit hospital subsidiary. Id.
186. See Billing Clinic Qualifies for (c)(3) Exemption, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 5,
1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. Although the Billings Clinic deter-
mination letter did not state the underlying facts surrounding the transaction, the local
newspaper describes the merger. See Pat Bellinghausen, A New Approach: Merger Im-
proves Efficiency, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Dec. 26, 1993, at Dl.
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zone for physician networks protects "physician-controlled"
ventures, such as IPAs, PPOs, and similar entities because they
"promise significant procompetitive benefits for consumers. '"187
The antitrust enforcement agencies have not yet developed
similar safety zones for hospital-controlled networks. Doctors
and hospitals compete for outpatient business, and a hospital-
controlled network is a competitive alternative to a physician-
controlled network. However, the enforcement agencies have
provided the analytic principles for evaluating multi-provider
networks, such as PHOs, because limited agency experience
and the considerable variation in the type of restraints and
likely efficiencies prevent the delineation of explicit safety
zones.188 Since the competitive effects of integrated networks
will be analyzed under a rule of reason analysis,189 hospital-
controlled ventures may use a common sense approach to eval-
uate network development arrangements. In antitrust enforce-
ment, the differences between hospitals and physicians are best
explained by the agencies' familiarity with physician-controlled
networks. The analytic principles show that the antitrust en-
forcement agencies intend to adapt to new delivery forms.
B. Health Plans
1. Referrals
HHS has developed a specific safe harbor for qualified
HMOs. 190 The managed care safe harbors do not cover PPOs
and IPAs not regulated by state insurance boards, hospital-
physician networks, contracts between providers and employers,
or any other network venture that includes referral incentives.
Similarly, self-referral law exempts only qualified prepaid
plans.""
One commentator argues that the distinction between re-
ferrals within an HMO and referrals among private practition-
ers is arbitrary because the substance of the referrals is the
same and both involve compensation for the coordination of
187. 1994 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 158, at S-16. See also
supra note 7 (discussing managed care acronyms).
188. See Id. at S-21.
189. Id. at S-23.
190. See supra notes 50-51 and surrounding text.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
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care.' The difference is that the HMO may retain the com-
pensation for coordinating care.'93
While this criticism may not be appropriate for kickbacks
and self-referrals among independent fee-for-service practition-
ers,"" IPA and PPO providers operate under different financial
incentives that support industry efforts to coordinate care and
reduce overutilization. As with health care provided by HMOs,
care provided in hospitals, ambulatory surgery, outpatient,
skilled nursing, and home health settings is subject to Medicare
and Medicaid utilization review. 95 Unnecessary care by physi-
cians in any of these settings may result in physician payment
denials. Thus, appropriate safeguards are in place to include
nontraditional managed care plans in the safe harbor. The dis-
tinction between staff-model HMO organizational forms and
IPAs and PPOs is unfounded and may lead to unprincipled,
preferential treatment of traditional staff-model HMOs over
newer health plan models.
2. Tax Exemption
Although Kaiser-Permanente, the nation's largest HMO,
is tax exempt, two-thirds of HMOs are not exempt. 9 " Cur-
rently, most tax-exempt HMOs qualify under section 501(c) (4)
of the Internal Revenue Code.19 7 However, tax exemption
under section 501(c)(3) is preferable to section 501(c)(4) be-
cause while both allow exemption from the corporate income
tax, section 501(c)(3) also allows access to tax-exempt bond
192. Frankford, supra note 45, at 1872.
193. Id.
194. See supra note 33 (regarding the empirical data on self-referrals).
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3 (1988). See also supra note 58.
196. Lee A. Sheppard, HMO Conversions and Self-dealing, 8 EXEMPT ORG TAX
REV. 844, 844-45 (1993). While most HMOs are organized as PAs, group-model HMOs
cover the majority of HMO enrollees. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES.
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, HEALTH UNITED STATES. 1991, at 210 (1992).
197. Sheppard, supra note 196, at 844-45. Section 501(c)(4) allows exemption for
organizations that are "not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion
of social welfare." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1990). Social welfare
organizations promote "the common good and general welfare" of the community as a
whole as opposed to members of a select group. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i) (as
amended in 1990). Although § 501(c)(4) does not prohibit private inurement, commercial
activities that are carried on analogous to for-profit organization activities will jeopardize
tax-exempt status. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
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financing, deductible donor contributions, and relatively fewer
restrictions on capital transfers. 198
As with physician organizations, the hospital paradigm op-
erates to discriminate against certain health plan organiza-
tional forms. Again, the IRS and the courts use the hospital
community benefit factors 99 to analyze HMO tax exemption
under section 501(c)(3).200 In Geisinger Health Plan v. Com-
missioner,20 1 the Third Circuit applied the hospital community
benefit test to determine whether a hospital-sponsored HMO
benefitted the community as well as its subscribers and deter-
mined that the HMO did not merit section 501(c)(3) tax ex-
emption. Important factors for obtaining exemption include the
direct provision of services and membership that is open to the
community.202 The Geisinger HMO did not merit exemption
since it arranged for care instead of providing it directly and it
served only its subscribers.
The Geisinger decision has been roundly criticized for con-
cluding that promoting health by "arranging for" health care
delivery was insufficient for tax exemption203 and for applying
the hospital community benefit standard inconsistently.204 The
effect of the Geisinger interpretation is to support the IRS pref-
erence for traditional staff-model HMOs 0 5 and to exclude
most non-staff HMOs from section 501(c)(3) qualification, 20 6
forcing them to seek section 501(c)(4) status or forego tax ex-
198. Sullivan, supra note 89, at 202.
199. See supra notes 98-99 and surrounding text (discussing the facts and circum-
stances analyzed under the community benefit test).
200. See Frederick J. Gerhart & Melissa B. Rasman, HMO Denied Section
501(c)(3) Status by Third Circuit, 4 J. TAX EXEMPT ORG. 17, 19 (1993); Sullivan supra
note 89, at 202.
201. 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993).
202. See Geisinger Health Plan, 985 F.2d at 1217-18 (distinguishing Geisinger from
Sound Health); Carlson, supra note 104, at 893.
203. Thomas K. Hyatt, Recent Developments for Tax-exempt Healthcare Organiza-
tions, 2 ANNALs HEALTH L. 79, 80-81 (1993) (arguing that this interpretation is inconsis-
tent with case law and private letter rulings).
204. Kenneth L. Levine, Geisinger Health Plan Likely to Adversely Affect HMOs
and Other Health Organizations, 79 J. TAX'N 90, 93 (1993) (arguing that the positive
factors in hospital analysis also should be used as positive factors in HMO analysis as
opposed to determinative reasons for exclusion).
205. See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Sept. 30, 1990) (denying exemption to
two non-staff model HMOs that arranged for health services). For a discussion of the dif-
ferences between staff- and group-model HMOs, see supra note 22.
206. Gerhart & Rasman, supra note 200, at 21.
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emption.207 Likewise, the IRS generally will deny tax exemp-
tion to IPA-model HMOs 08 The IRS's reasons for denying ex-
emption are that IPAs provide physicians with access to large
pools of patients and thus primarily benefit member physicians
rather than the community.209
In 1986, Congress revised the treatment of Blue Cross and
other plans providing health insurance in order to restrict tax
exemption.210 Now, a section 501(c)(4) exempt social welfare
organization that provides "commercial-type insurance" as a
substantial part of its activities is not exempt. 11 In contrast,
health insurance customarily provided by an HMO as an inci-
dent to its plan offerings will not jeopardize tax-exempt
status.212
The preferential treatment of staff-model HMOs over
group-model HMOs and IPAs should be reconsidered in light
of today's realities and consumer preferences. As providers ac-
cept utilization controls or discounted pricing in order to join or
form financing vehicles, the relative public-private benefit bal-
ance has been altered. While patients report higher satisfaction
in fee-for-service outpatient care than prepaid care, they prefer
prepaid multi-specialty group care over staff-model HMO
care.
2 13
The organizational preferences of the IRS will affect con-
sumer options in the future. 14 Due to the profit potential of
207. Hyatt, supra note 203, at 81.
208. See Sullivan, supra note 89, at 201.
209. Id. See also Rev. Rul 86-98, 1986-2 C.B. 74; Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,829 (Sept.
10, 1990).
210. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 1012(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2390-
94 (1986) (codified at I.R.C. § 501(m) (1988)). Blue Cross was originally exempt under
§ 501 (c)(4). Marmor et al., supra note 86, at 323 (detailing the history of the Blue Cross
exemption). The intent of § 501(m) was to level the playing field and reduce Blue Cross's
competitive advantage over commercial insurers. Sullivan, supra note 89, at 205.
211. See I.R.C. § 501(m) (1988).
212. Id. § 501(m)(3)(b).
213. Kaya R. Rubine et al., Patients' Ratings of Outpatient Visits in Different Prac-
tice Settings: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study, 270 JAMA 835, 837-39 (1993)
(surveying patient attitudes toward outpatient care in Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles as
part of the multi-site Medical Outcomes Study).
214. For a discussion of the relative differences and the similarities between for-
profit and nonprofit delivery systems, see generally BRADFORD H. GRAY. THE PROFIT MO-
TIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE CHANGING ACCOUNTABILITY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS
(1991) (documenting the controversies surrounding the industry transformation from com-
munity service values to corporate values and the impact of the corporate culture on pro-
vider accountability).
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HMOs in a managed care environment, many section
501(c)(4) HMOs are converting to for-profit status or alterna-
tively, selling out to large for-profit chains.2 15 In a managed
competition environment, consumer choices among nonprofit
health plans may become limited.
3. Antitrust
In contrast with tax exemption, antitrust laws provide
greater protection to commercial insurers through the McCar-
ran-Ferguson limited antitrust exemption.2 1 6 The "business of
insurance" exemption allows insurance companies to set rates
collectively because unbridled competition among insurers
might result in insolvency.2 17 But providers that undertake sub-
stantial financial risk, such as capitation, also could argue that
without collective rate making, they too might establish capi-
tated rates that are inadequate to meet patient requirements.
Hospitals, traditional HMOs, group practices, and their
participating physicians may obtain a qualified immunity from
private antitrust challenges such as boycott activities by com-
plying with the Health Care Quality Improvement Act proce-
dural requirements for peer review activities.1 8 In addition to
following the formal peer review process, health care entities
such as HMOs and group practices must provide health care
services. 1 Provider networks that do not provide services di-
rectly might not obtain the same level of protection that tradi-
tional HMO plans enjoy.220
Thus, while antitrust law has been credited with protecting
the development of managed care, within this framework, fed-
eral law immunizes rate-making activities of traditional insur-
ance companies and certain boycott activities of hospitals and
215. See Sheppard, supra note 196, at 844-46 (discussing the management buyout of
California's second largest HMO and the Humana purchase of Group Health Association
in Washington state).
216. See statute and cases cited supra note 139.
217. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, The Case for Antitrust Reform for Physician
Groups. in HEALTH CARE REFORM & ANTITRUST 1994, at 97, 99 (PLI Com. L. & Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4456, 1994).
218. See supra note 141. The exemption applies to hospitals and "health care enti-
ties" and their participating physicians. 42 U.S.C. § 1 11 (a)(1), (b) (1988).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 11151 (1988) (emphasis added).
220. Compare to Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210, 1217-18
(3d Cir. 1993), and supra notes 200-03 and surrounding text (noting the denial of an
HMO's tax exemption because it did not provide services directly).
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traditional HMOs. As providers begin to integrate health care
delivery with health care fiduciary and as new integrated mod-
els emerge, the application of the antitrust laws does not afford
similar protections. 2 1 Since many providers are developing in-
sured products to complement their delivery structures, they
should be cautious when engaging in direct employer con-
tracting or unprotected PHO, IPA, and PPO development if
antitrust risks are present.
Established integrated delivery systems often receive pref-
erential treatment over newer forms. For example, the Mayo
Foundation is a physician-managed, nonprofit integrated health
system 2 that has developed a well-deserved reputation for low
costs, high quality, and patient satisfaction. 2 3 Understandably,
this model could raise self-referral and exemption concerns.
However, a self-referral exception grandfathers hospital ar-
rangements with group practices established before 1989.24
Presumably, this exception would apply to the Mayo Clinic.
Further, the Mayo Clinic and similar established health care
entities are governed by physician-controlled boards without
any apparent diminution in community benefit or problems
with private inurement.2 5 The Mayo Clinic may be a model
that Congress wishes to protect from self-referral proscriptions
221. The "business of insurance" anomaly may be short-lived given current legisla-
tive efforts to require insurance companies to "operate in a normal antitrust environment."
Insurance Group Backs Compromise that Would Modify Antitrust Exemption, 3 Health
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 729, 729 (Jun. 2, 1994) (discussing proposals to repeal McCar-
ran-Ferguson). See also Bloch and Falk, supra note 139, at 27.
222. STARR, supra note 22, at 211.
223. See generally April Hattori, Innovation in the Cornfields Makes the Mayo
Foundation a Fast-moving Heavyweight in Both Finance and Medicine, 300 BOND BUYER
4 (1992) (noting that the Mayo Clinic is a low-cost provider whose drawing cards are high
standards and a philosophy of patient-centered care); Gary Jacobsen, The Healthcare Biz:
Alive and Kicking at the Mayo Clinic, 78 MGMT. REV. 10 (1989) (noting that from 1967-
85, the Mayo Clinic's annual prices increased at the same rate as the Consumer Price
Index).
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(7) (Supp. V 1993). Services provided by groups
and billed by hospitals are excepted if the arrangement was established before Dec. 19,
1989, has been in perpetual effect, the group furnishes "substantially all" of the inpatient
services, and the compensation does not account for referral volume or value. Id.
225. See William J. Aseltyne & Gerald R. Peters, Tax Exemption and Integrated
Delivery Systems, 20 Topics IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING 46, 53 n.l 1 (1994) (noting that
the IRS approach to new integrated delivery system development is more cautious than
with established systems such as the Mayo Clinic); Colombo, supra note 93, at 241-42
(noting that the IRS differentiates between established and new delivery systems).
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and that deserves tax exemption. However, newer integrated
delivery models deserve to be treated similarly.
One explanation for this distinction between older and
newer integrated delivery systems, particularly in the area of
tax exemption, is a political bias for mainstream, well-estab-
lished organizations. 26 While politics will certainly pervade
any federal initiatives surrounding provider standards, political
choices today will affect consumers' health care delivery
choices tomorrow. The federal government should become more
sensitive to the impact these exceptions and privileges may
have on the development and availability of innovative new de-
livery systems.2 7
IV. TENSIONS AMONG THE LAWS
A. Conflicting Rationales
Tension among the fraud and abuse, self-referral, tax-ex-
emption, and antitrust laws is inevitable given the different ra-
tionale of each statute. As previously mentioned, the purposes
of anti-kickback and self-referral laws are to protect Medicare
assets from overutilization as well as the referral fees associ-
ated with provider conflicts of interests.2 8 The primary ration-
ale for federal tax exemption is disputed but several theories
have been offered, including the subsidy theory, the capital
compensation theory, the altruism theory, and the donor the-
ory.229 The purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote con-
sumer welfare through the protection of efficient markets.3
Conflicts between the anti-kickback and self-referral laws
and the antitrust laws occur when stewardship goals and stan-
dards for provider integrity are not economically efficient.
Prohibiting physician investment in facilities to which they re-
fer their patients saves hospitals from the menacing competi-
tion of physician-owned entities.2 3 1 The anti-kickback laws im-
226. See Marlis L. Carson, Brier and Mancino Address Health Care Tax Issues, 7
EXEMPT ORG. REv. 717, 718 (1993) (noting that revocation of the exempt status of estab-
lished charities may be a political impossibility).
227. See also Marmor et al., supra note 86, at 348.
228. See supra notes 31-33 and surrounding text.
229. See supra notes 78-86 and surrounding text.
230. See supra notes 125-29 and surrounding text.
231. T.J. Sullivan & V. Moore, A Critical Look at Recent Developments in Tax
Exempt Hospitals, 23 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 65, 79 (1990).
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pede the development of competing cost-effective practices.3 2
If anti-kickback, self-referral, and tax-exemption laws also dis-
courage development of provider-sponsored integrated delivery
systems, consumers will be denied valuable competitive alterna-
tives. 233 Tax exemption also may reduce competition and allo-
cate resources inefficiently by providing "preferential
subsidies. 23 4
Conversely, pure competition may result in referral fiduci-
ary conflicts and inadequate recognition of the public goods
and the community benefit provided by tax-exempt providers.
Physicians may have fundamentally different roles in their fidu-
ciary relationship with patients than those found in ordinary
consumer transactions, and antitrust law, by focusing on eco-
nomic efficiency, may not account for non-economic harms
caused by a fiduciary breach.3 5 Where tax exemption is predi-
cated upon market failure, because consumer evaluation is dif-
ficult, or on governmental subsidies for public goods such as
indigent care, tax exemption assumes that pure competition is
not always desirable. However, it is difficult to justify tax ex-
emptions for providers that do not relieve governmental bur-
dens or are not distinguishable from for-profit commercial en-
terprises. An analysis of some typical transactions helps to
explore the resulting tensions caused by these separate bodies
of law.
232. King, supra note 31, at 667-69 (discussing conflicts between competition and
anti-kickback law).
233. See supra part I1I.B.
234. See John G. Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review
of Federal and State Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 67,
77 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987). This problem has been reduced with the passage of the
unrelated business income tax (UBIT) and revocation of the "destination of income test"
that allowed charitable organizations to siphon profits from commercial ventures if profit
distributions supported the charitable exempt organization. Bruce Hopkins, The Legal
Context of Nonprofit Enterprise, in THE NONPROFIT ENTREPRENEUR (Edward Skloot, ed.,
1988) (stating that the UBIT objective is to prevent "unfair competition between tax-ex-
empt organizations and for-profit, commercial enterprises."). See also I.R.C. §§ 511, 512
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.511-3 (1994).
235. But see E. Haavi Morreim, Blessed Be the Tie that Binds? Antitrust Perils of
Physician Investment and Self-referral, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 359, 409-12 (1993) (arguing
that despite the fiduciary relationship, vigorous antitrust enforcement and informed patient
choice is preferable to proscriptions against self-referrals).
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B. Examples of Conflicts
Each transaction in the development of an integrated de-
livery system must be thoroughly analyzed and justified for
compliance with federal law.236 Sample transactions include
provider joint ventures, physician recruitment, and hospital ac-
quisition of physician practices. The entry models of integrated
delivery systems typically rely upon joint ventures as a transi-
tional vehicle to integration. 3 7 Physician recruitment is a pre-
requisite for any model. Physician practice acquisition is a
component of the more advanced efforts to integrate networks
of providers. As providers analyze these transactions, they will
encounter significant conflicts among federal agencies.
1. Provider Joint Ventures
Providers, primarily hospitals and physicians, have at-
tempted to develop joint ventures in the transition toward inte-
gration. Joint ventures are often created strategically to develop
a working alliance, minimize conflicting economic incentives,
promote shared loyalties, enhance capital access, and generate
additional revenues.2 38
OIG's anti-kickback concern surrounding joint ventures is
that the investment interest will affect a physician's choice of
referral.2 39 The OIG is concerned about the manner in which
investors are selected, the business structure of the joint ven-
ture, and the distribution of profits.2 40 Two limited safe harbors
are available for investment interests: investments in a large,
236. HHS requires multi-transactional agreements to include separate justifications
for each component requiring a safe harbor. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,961 (1991) (com-
menting on regulations codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
237. See supra notes 24-26 and surrounding text.
238. See generally John D. Blair et al., Hospital-Physician Joint Ventures: A Stra-
tegic Approach for Both Dimensions of Success, 35 HosP. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 3
(1990) (discussing the advantages of joint ventures for hospitals and physicians).
239. Kusserow, supra, note 29, at 54.
240. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SER-
VICES. SPECIAL FRAUD ALERT. JOINT VENTURE ARRANGEMENTS (1989), reprinted in 59
Fed. Reg. 65,372, 65,374 (Dec. 19, 1994). See also Inspector General v. The Hanlester
Network, Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 39,566 (HHS Departmental Appeals Bd.,
Appellate Div., Sept. 18, 1991) (holding that inducement may be inferred from a venture
between a lab network and referring physicians because the offer was limited to potential
referral sources, referring physicians were discouraged from alternatives, and profits were
excessive in relation to the risks involved).
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publicly traded company241 and small entity investments that
limit the percentage of investments by investors who may influ-
ence or make referrals and limit the gross revenue from refer-
rals generated by interested investors. 242 The self-referral law
prohibits physician investment in ventures that provide desig-
nated health services, but unlike the anti-kickback laws, there
are no joint venture safe harbors.2 43
Joint ventures that involve sharing of nonprofit hospital
ancillary revenues with physicians will jeopardize tax exemp-
tion. 44 In GCM 39,862, the IRS held that the transfer of a
hospital net revenue stream through a joint venture with physi-
cians results in per se inurement because it amounts to a divi-
dend distribution.245 The hospital benefit factors such as im-
proved financial health or greater efficiencies were
reinterpreted to hold that these hospital benefits exhibit only a
"most tenuous relationship to the hospitals' charitable purpose
of promoting health. 246
GCM 39,862 is the first agency attempt to acknowledge
the relationship between anti-kickback violations and tax ex-
emption. The IRS held that if a transaction violates the anti-
kickback law, sufficient grounds exist for the loss of tax exemp-
tion.247 As the official link between tax exemption and anti-
kickback laws, GCM 39,862 represents a maturing regulatory
philosophy.2 48 However, the IRS examination and enforcement
241. 42 C.F.R. 1001.952 (a)(1) (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 37,202, 37,203-04 (1994) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (proposed July 21, 1994).
242. 42 C.F.R. 1001.952(a)(2)(ii),(iv) (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 37,202, 37,203-05
(1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (proposed July 21, 1994). A limited safe
harbor has also been proposed for investments in rural areas. See 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008,
49,008 (1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (proposed Sept. 21, 1993).
243. Statutory exemptions do exist for publicly traded investment interests, group
practice ownership and investment interests, hospital ownership by physicians, and owner-
ship and investment interests by rural physicians. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)-(b) (Supp. V
1993).
244. See Kenneth L. Levine, Tax Planning After General Counsel Memorandum
39,862: The Brave New World of Tax Exempt Hospitals, 25 J. HEALTH & Hose L 143,
143 (1992).
245. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
246. See id. See also Paul Streckfus, Bromberg Speaks Out on Physician Recruit-
ment by Tax-Exempt Hospitals, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REv. 714, 715-16 (1993) (arguing
that Rev. Rul. 76-91 takes precedence over GCM 39,862 and that the distinction between
a hospital benefitting itself and benefitting this community is revolutionary).
247. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
248. See also infra note 293 (discussing integrated delivery system determination
letters).
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of health laws is a remarkable expansion of its jurisdiction over
tax law.
In contrast with self-referral proscriptions, antitrust law
allows the development of provider joint ventures so long as the
ventures do not amass sufficient market power to be anticompe-
titive. The FTC responded to HHS's request for comments on
proposed anti-kickback regulations by outlining the procompe-
titive benefits of physician participation in joint ventures such
as the unique input of physicians in determining community
need, reducing costs through organizational efficiencies, in-
creasing access to equity sources of capital, and improving
quality by placing both the referral and the physician invest-
ment at risk for quality delivery.250
Above a certain level of physician participation, self-refer-
rals may create anticompetitive risks.2 51 To settle charges of
anticompetitive conduct by a physician-owned medical equip-
ment company, the FTC recently required a partial divestiture
of referring pulmonologists. 52 Roughly 60% of the local refer-
ring pulmonologists were partners in the company, allowing the
company to amass market power over home oxygen services
since the pulmonologist partners could influence patient choice
among home oxygen equipment.2 53 The divestiture agreement
required the company to reduce the percentage ownership of
pulmonologists to 25 % within eight months of the agreement
or to risk total divestiture.254
249. Wagner, supra note 118, at 492. For a discussion of IRS enforcement tech-
niques, see generally Kenneth L. Levine, IRS Enforcement of Health Care Laws, 6 Ex-
EMPT ORG. TAx REV. 921 (1992).
250. Theodore N. McDowell, Jr., Physician Self-referral Arrangements: Legitimate
Business or Unethical 'Entrepreneuralism, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 61, 70-73 (1989) (noting
that the dangers of anticompetitive effects such as overutilization and increased costs also
exist within non-prohibited practices).
251. See generally Michael Black & James Langenfeld, Economic Theories of the
Potential Anticompetitive Impact of Physician-owned Joint Ventures, ANTITRUST BULL.,
Summer 1994, at 385 (providing an economic framework for antitrust challenges to self-
referral joint ventures). See also Morreim, supra note 235, at 405-07 (discussing potential
antitrust challenges to self-referral joint ventures); Arquit Reveals Existence of FTC
Probes of Ventures on Physician Self-Referrals, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1551, at 140 (Feb. 6, 1992) (noting that potential challenges include attempted monopoli-
zation, naked restraints, or substantial lessening of competition).
252. See Homecare Oxygen & Medical Equip. Co. et al., 58 Fed. Reg. 60,653
(1993) (FTC proposed consent agreement).
253. Id. at 60,656.
254. Id. at 60,661.
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Further, the antitrust enforcement agencies can distin-
guish between provider joint ventures with the legitimate com-
petitive purpose of improving the delivery system and the an-
ticompetitive joint ventures designed to create captive referral
systems for ancillary services. According to the Justice Depart-
ment, legitimate provider joint ventures that include economic
risk sharing, integrated operations, and new products are not
likely to be prosecuted.255 The new antitrust guidelines actually
protect legitimate, procompetitive joint ventures like PHOs and
physician networks by applying a rule of reason analysis to the
competitive effects of integrated ventures. 256 Despite provider
perceptions, the antitrust laws do not erect significant barriers
to joint venture development, and the enforcement agencies are
not likely to contest legitimate joint ventures.
Whether self-referral law applies to physician-owned enti-
ties formed to contract with third parties to manage delivery is
not clear.2 57 If so, self-referral law would prevent physicians
from investing in IPAs and PHOs in which they provide
care.258 Such an application would conflict with the antitrust
guidelines designed to promote consumer welfare by allowing
the development of physician-controlled networks that provide
procompetitive benefits.
Thus, the antitrust guidelines may allow an investment in-
terest that is proscribed under self-referral, jeopardizes tax ex-
emption, and implicates anti-kickback violations. Since conduct
aimed at competitor exclusion is anticompetitive and may raise
per se antitrust violations, 259 antitrust law is congruent with
anti-kickback law for anticompetitive ventures that foreclose
competition through a captive referral system. Since providers
have been advised to proceed with caution,2 60 and at least one
noted integrated delivery system expert has advised hospitals to
255. Terese Hudson, Health Care Reform Advocates Urge Changes to Antitrust
Laws, Hosps., Apr. 5, 1992, at 40.
256. 1994 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 158, at S-17, S-23.
257. Schermer & Owens, supra note 28, at 26. Examples of such entities would
include IPAs and PHOs.
258. Arguably, an IPA may meet the group practice exception. See supra notes 60-
63 and surrounding text.
259. Grady, supra note 162, at 804.
260. Charles MacKelvie & Mary L. McGuire, Fraud, Abuse and Inurement: The
Growing Impact on Provider-Physician Relations, 23 J. HEALTH & HosP L 1, 7 (1990)
(warning physicians about the structure of and motivation behind joint ventures).
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"get rid of all joint ventures," 26' the tension surrounding
procompetitive integrated delivery ventures draws tighter.
2. Physician Recruitment
Physician recruitment by hospitals highlights the tension
between tax exemption and the anti-kickback and self-referral
laws. The OIG considers incentive programs such as income
guarantees, physician office staff training, subsidized attend-
ance at conferences or continuing medical education programs,
discounted office space, and low interest loans suspect because
they may inflate Medicare costs and interfere with appropriate
referrals.262 Although HHS received many comments on the
community benefits of physician recruitment and the need for a
specific safe harbor protection,263 it has proposed only a very
limited safe harbor for physician relocations to rural areas.26 4
The self-referral statute allows physician recruitment only if
the physician relocates to a hospital service area, the amount of
the inducement is not related to "the volume or value of any
referrals by the referring physician," and the arrangement
meets HHS regulatory requirements.265
On the other hand, GCM 39,498 articulates the IRS pol-
icy on physician recruitment and allows recruitment under
specified circumstances. 26   Recruited physicians are presump-
261. Sarah Harlan, Health Care Tax Developments: How to Develop an IDS, 8 Ex-
EMPT ORG. TAX REV. 998, 1000 (1993) (quoting Gerald Peters, the attorney for Friendly
Hills and Billings Clinic) (emphasis added). See also COILE, supra note 2, at 166-67 (ad-
vising hospitals to terminate joint ventures with physicians due to the anti-kickback, self-
referral, and tax exemption risks).
262. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES.
SPECIAL FRAUD ALERT: HOSPITAL INCENTIVES TO PHYSICIANS (1992), reprinted in 59 Fed.
Reg. 65,372, 65,375 (Dec. 19, 1994). The fraud alert presumes that such activities are
improperly motivated. Sanford V. Teplitzky, Hospital-Physician Relationships Including
Physician Recruitment, Address Before the National Health Lawyers Association (Sept.
27, 1993), in HEALTHCARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990s, 1993, at 7
(abstract available from the National Health Lawyers Association).
263. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,982 (1991) (commenting on regulations codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 1001).
264. 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008, 49,010-11 (1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001)
(proposed Sept. 21, 1993); Julie Johnsson, What's OK in Recruitment, AM. MED. NEWS,
Nov 1, 1993, at 2.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(5) (Supp. V 1993). See also 57 Fed. Reg. 8588, 8599
(1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411) (proposed Mar. 11, 1992) (requiring in addi-
tion a written agreement, prohibiting restrictions on staff privileges at other hospitals, and
qualifying the referral value to prohibit referrals generated to the hospital).
266. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Apr. 24, 1986).
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tively "insiders" and therefore subject to proscriptions on in-
urement.267 However, GCM 39,498 allows a reasonable com-
pensation exception determined by reference to hospital benefit,
including improved hospital productivity and efficiency.268 A
hospital may offer remuneration based upon the value of the
physician to 'the community in order to meet the reasonable
compensation test.269 Hospitals engaging in improper practices
such as providing unreasonable compensation or not linking
physician compensation to responsibilities for providing com-
munity benefits may face significant penalties. °
Limits on physician recruitment may produce tension with
private sector initiatives to create a more efficient, competitive
marketplace. The safe harbors do not protect some legitimate
yet efficient recruitment initiatives that reduce costs. For exam-
ple, if a hospital's recruitment of a neonatologist is critical to
the development of its integrated system and a local neonatolo-
gist has an inadequate patient base to support her practice, the
hospital may not induce the local neonatologist to join its staff
without risking anti-kickback sanctions since her existing pa-
tients are likely to follow her. A rural hospital must forego this
local opportunity and recruit from over 100 miles away in or-
der to follow the proposed anti-kickback safe harbor.71 More-
over, no safe harbor protects a suburban hospital or an urban
hospital in a medically underserved area. 72 The local ne-
onatologist faces a restraint of trade imposed by the anti-kick-
back law.
Thus, an attempt by a nonprofit hospital to protect its tax
exemption by compensating the physician for his or her referral
267. See supra notes 107-08 and surrounding text.
268. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Apr. 24, 1986).
269. Id. The arrangement must also pass the private benefit test. See discussion
supra part II.B. (regarding determination of incidental private benefit). The transaction in
question failed the private benefit test because it was impossible to determine whether this
package of incentives was necessary to recruit the physicians, and the lack of caps on the
income guarantee might lead to private benefit greater than the public benefit of promoting
health through the recruited physician. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Apr. 24, 1986).
270. See Closing Agreement, supra note 77 (discussing a voluntary closing agree-
ment between the IRS and Hermann Hospital that required the hospital to pay over one
million dollars in penalties for engaging in questionable physician recruitment practices).
271. Johnsson, supra note 264, at 30 (discussing an example of neonatologist recruit-
ment). The recruitment of a local physician also would violate self-referral law as the stat-
ute requires that a recruited physician "relocate" to a hospital service area. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395nn(e)(s) (Supp. V 1993).
272. Johnsson, supra note 264, at 30.
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value may lead to both anti-kickback and self-referral viola-
tions. The conflicts among agencies are identified by commen-
tators but not resolved by the agencies, and the resulting lack
of clarity has led to inherent contradictions 73 and the termina-
tion of physician recruitment programs by many hospitals.7 4
The foregone opportunities to recruit necessary physicians for a
hospital network impede private-sector integrated delivery sys-
tem development.
3. Hospital Acquisition of Physician Practices
In preparation for managed care contracting, all types of
hospitals across the nation are acquiring physician practices. 7 5
Needs for access to patients in managed care plans, capital for
practice expansion, risk-sharing partners, and practice support
systems are driving physicians to sell their practices.2 6 In order
to develop competitive integrated delivery systems, most acqui-
sitions involve primary care specialties such as family practice,
internal medicine, and obstetrics and gynecology. 7
Self-referral law allows a one-time sale of a physician
practice to any entity. The transaction must be consistent with
fair market value, be commercially reasonable even if the phy-
sician did not refer to the acquiring entity, not relate to the
future referral value, and meet HHS regulatory require-
ments.2 78 In contrast, the anti-kickback safe harbor applies
only to practice acquisitions by other physicians279 because
HHS believes that practice sales to hospitals may increase
273. See, e.g., William M. Copeland, Recruiting Physicians: Avoiding the Legal
Minefield, 37 Hosp. & HEALTH SERVICEs ADMIN. 269, 280 (1992) (noting that careful
structuring of physician recruitment activities requires the balancing of "inherently contra-
dicting requirements.").
274. Sarah C. Harlan, Hospitals Curtail Physician Recruitment Practices, 7 Ex-
EMPT ORG TAx REV. 751, 752 (1993) (discussing the effect of the lack of clarity on hospi-
tal recruitment practices).
275. COILE, supra note 2, at 162-63.
276. Id. at 165. Coile predicts that hospitals will focus on young physicians entering
practice who generally desire personal security over autonomy and independence. Id. at
166.
277. Id. at 163 (citing a national survey of PHOs).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(5) (Supp. V 1993). See also 57 Fed. Reg. 8588, 8599
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411) (proposed Mar. 11, 1992) (requiring in addition a
written agreement and prohibiting any other financial relationship between the parties dur-
ing the prior and subsequent years). The extension of financing by the physician to the
hospital would disturb the OIG. See Thornton, supra note 52, at 13.
279. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(e) (1993).
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Medicare program costs and compensate physicians for
referrals.280
The OIG and the IRS are beginning to coordinate their
efforts to scrutinize physician practice acquisitions.2 81 Respond-
ing to an IRS request for anti-kickback guidance on hospital
acquisitions of physician practices that result in the "common
ownership or control" of both hospitals and physicians, the
OIG reiterated its concern that such acquisitions may be so-
phisticated profit-sharing arrangements that violate the anti-
kickback statute. 82 In contrast, the IRS prefers physician
practice acquisitions over leasing or licensing because the asset
acquisition ensures hospital control over key assets such as pa-
tient records and managed care contracts..28  Both agencies
have concerns that the acquisition price should reflect no more
than fair market value,28 4 but the IRS allows the acquisition
price to include intangible assets such as goodwill, non-compete
agreements, HMO contracts, and patient records.2 5
In the area of antitrust, acquisition analysis may turn on
whether a hospital is acquiring the practice of a competing
physician. 6 Physicians and hospitals are often competitors,
and horizontal agreements between the two are disfavored, re-
quiring increased justification for collaborative activity.28 7 In
the analysis of anticompetitive effects, one commentator argues
that the anti-kickback statute, in conjunction with antitrust
law, erodes physician bargaining power, co-opts professional
280. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,975 (1991) (commenting on regulations codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 1001); Kusserow, supra note 29, at 57-58.
281. Julie Johnsson, Feds Look for Fraud, Abuse in Practice Sales, AM MED
NEWS, Mar. 15, 1993, at 1, 37.
282. See Thornton Letter, supra note 65, at 244.
283. IRS 1994 TEXTBOOK, supra note 20, at 217.
284. Id. at 219.
285. Id.
286. See Peters Address, supra note 43, at 47 (noting that horizontal mergers re-
ceive increased scrutiny over vertical mergers regarding the potential lessening of
competition).
287. Frankford, supra note 45, at 1924-25. Frankford argues that the production of
health care, like any other economic good, requires collective activity driven by market
forces. Id. at 1862. Frankford believes that because regulatory prohibitions such as those
encompassed within the anti-kickback statute channel these collective activities into institu-
tional forms employing professional labor, independent professionals will be coopted by
bureaucratic institutions that standardize health care delivery and reduce patient auton-
omy. Id. at 1863-64.
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judgment, and enhances bureaucratic power at the expense of
patient autonomy.28
In its anti-kickback advice, the OIG also noted that a
comparison of the acquired physicians' financial welfare before
and after the acquisition would be revealing because physicians
may improve their economic position.289 Such an inquiry is re-
vealing because it contradicts the OIG's assumptions regarding
the extent of such lucrative transactions. Due to the fear of
being left out of the managed competition environment, many
physicians are selling their practices at less than fair market
value.290 Again, the paradigm shift in health care has altered
many of the assumptions embedded into the current regulatory
framework.
C. Lack of Interagency Coordination
The statutory goals underlying the regulation by these
three agencies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is pos-
sible to maintain the custodial goals of the Medicare program
while promoting charitable activities and protecting open mar-
kets. However, since notable conflicts exist among agency di-
rectives, efforts to coordinate directives have not been very ef-
fective in reconciling these statutory goals.
Although primitive attempts at agency coordination have
been made, these efforts have not been successful in harmoniz-
ing standards for integrated delivery systems. For example, the
FTC asked HHS to develop safe harbors for provider discounts
to PPOs because anti-kickback liability is so ambiguous and
the discounts are not designed to induce medically unnecessary
referrals.29 1 Yet liability for provider-sponsored competitive al-
ternatives still remains unclear.292
A prime example of the lack of effective coordination
among the agencies is the unresolved conflict between HHS
and the IRS that effectively prevents advance tax-exemption
determinations of compliance in transactions involving physi-
cian practice acquisitions. Due to the inability to determine
288. Id. at 1864.
289. Thornton Letter, supra note 65, at 245.
290. See Breisch & Johnsson, supra note 119, at 15 (emphasis added).
291. FTC Staff Urges HHS to Clarify Legality of Arrangements by HMOs. Other
Providers, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1346, at 988 (Dec. 24, 1987).
292. See supra part III.B.I.
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anti-kickback violations in advance, the IRS conditions inte-
grated delivery system determination letters upon compliance
with anti-kickback law. 93 Although the IRS professes its reluc-
tance to use a non-tax statute if courts and the responsible
agency have not yet enforced integrated delivery system com-
pliance,294 the conditional nature of the rulings is based on
troublesome legal grounds because the broad nature of anti-
kickback prohibitions often makes it impossible to determine if
an arrangement violates the law.295 Many integrated delivery
systems serve a public purpose and confer a public benefit, the
ultimate tests for tax exemption. Further, an isolated violation
of the ambiguous anti-kickback prohibitions, while potentially
criminal, should hardly be considered a violation of a clearly
enunciated legal norm and necessarily inconsistent with a char-
itable purpose.
Before a hospital vertically integrates with physicians
holding managed care contracts, it cannot be assured of the
anti-kickback consequences of combining managed care con-
tracts into an integrated system, despite advance rulings from
other agencies that the arrangement provides a public benefit
and is procompetitive. Despite the need for provider guidance,
the OIG has stated that the conflict with the IRS over whether
payments for intangible assets represent inducement for refer-
rals is not resolvable. 2 6 Further, the conflict appears related to
the inability of the IRS and HHS "to work in tandem"'297 and
293. See IRS 1994 TEXTBOOK, supra note 20, at 234. See also Levine, supra note
96. The lineage of the conditional nature of these rulings may be traced to the Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,862 on provider joint ventures stating that Medicare anti-kickback violations may
provide the grounds for revocation of exemption. J. Anthony Manger, Tax Developments:
Do They Shed Light?, 10 Healthspan (P-H L. & Bus.) No. 6, at 2 (June, 1993).
294. IRS 1994 TEXTBOOK, supra note 20, at 234.
295. Manger, supra note 293, at 2. IRS denial of exemption due to anti-kickback
violations is based on common law notions that illegal activities are inconsistent with ex-
empt purposes and on the Supreme Court decision in Bob Jones that activities violating a
clearly enunciated public policy are likewise inconsistent. See Jean Wright & Jay H. Rotz,
Illegality & Public Policy Considerations, in IRS 1994 TEXTBOOK, supra note 20, at 155-
58, 163. However, the common law rationale is based on the notion that "a charitable trust
fails if it violates public policy embodied in the criminal law or otherwise clearly enunci-
ated as a legal norm" and the Bob Jones decision is based on the notion that charitable
organizations must serve a "public purpose and confer a public benefit." John G. Simon,
supra note 211, at 87-88 (emphasis added).
296. See Paul Streckfus, 'Point of Tension' Between IRS and HHS Making Health
Care Tax Practitioners Edgy, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 755, 756 (1993) (quoting D.
McCarty Thornton).
297. Id. at 755.
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has even been characterized as a "feud. 29 8 One observer sug-
gests that a factor in the conflict is that the IRS is closely at-
tuned to federal health policy and that HHS has not yet "got-
ten the word. 299 Whatever the resolution, the conflicts among
agencies should be resolved openly.300
The foremost reason that interagency coordination is
needed is that each agency has established primary competen-
cies in different areas. For example, proposals to allow HHS
screening of mergers and joint ventures rather than the FTC or
the Justice Department 30 ' would allow HHS's familiarity with
quality and access to influence policy making in this arena.
However, HHS has no expertise in competition analysis.02 The
IRS has suggested that antitrust violations also might be a ba-
sis for revocation of exempt status on the grounds that antitrust
principles encourage increased numbers of competitors and an-
titrust violations are harmful to society.303 Like HHS, the IRS
has no special competence in this area. Further, it is questiona-
ble whether the IRS or the FTC should be making decisions
that require health policy expertise.3 0 4
The expertise that each agency has developed bears on the
resolution of the problems providers face in understanding and
complying with federal law as they develop integrated delivery
systems. For effective integrated delivery systems development
within a private health care system, coordination of directives
among the agencies charged with enforcing federal statutes is
necessary. Instead, the regulatory apparatus itself creates a le-
gal obstacle to the transition toward an integrated industry.
V. PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS
To the extent these laws have a chilling effect on compe-
tition, they must be recognized and reconciled with current
health care policy. To the extent the laws protect patients,
maintain the integrity of the medical profession, and success-
298. HHS Casts Doubt on 501(c)(3) Tax-Exemption Granted to Integrated Delivery
Systems by IRS, MANAGED CARE L. OUTLOOK, May 1993, at 10.
299. Streckfus, supra note 296, at 756.
300. Unfortunately, the conflict is expected to be resolved behind the scenes. Id.
301. See HHS to Remain Neutral on Hospital Merger Enforcement, Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1599, at 71 (Jan. 28, 1993).
302. Bloch & Falk, supra note 11, at 218.
303. Wright & Rotz, supra note 295, at 175.
304. See Colombo & Hall, supra note 95, at 31.
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fully control costs, they should be strengthened and sup-
ported. Further . . .legislative efforts should be directed at
eliminating the inherent inconsistencies and creating a solid
legal framework within which the health care industry can
function.30 5
Separately developed legal rules regulating health care
providers have resulted in a lack of vision in health policy and a
"patchwork of separate responses to various problems, with
each reform creating a new distortion. '"306 Health care is an
important issue demanding significant public attention as
health reform at federal and state levels is debated. Most cur-
rent reform efforts would continue to rely on private systems of
health care delivery.3 07 A discussion of the chaotic impact of
the existing regulatory framework on private health care prov-
iders has been missing from the debate. To ensure that rational
responses are developed to solve health care delivery problems,
reforms must include the reduction of interagency conflicts, the
resolution of unjustifiable inconsistencies in the application and
enforcement of federal law, and the expression of policy prefer-
ences and difficult choices among competing principles of
health care cost, quality, and access.
A. Objectives for Interventions
Principled methods must guide the development of solu-
tions for harmonizing provider standards, and unless objectives
are set, the outcome will be beset with the same fundamental
weaknesses as current law. For purposes of this Note, several
objectives are proposed. The process and the outcomes must be
congruent, rational, open, consistent, coherent, legitimate, and
flexible. An intervention is congruent if it complements and is
consistent with national health policy. If policymakers clearly
305. MacKelvie & McGuire, supra note 260, at I (discussing the legal conflicts be-
tween anti-kickback and tax-exemption over joint ventures and the resulting policy conflict
with the Medicare prospective payment system).
306. Robert L. Dickman et al., An End to Patchwork Reform of Health Care, 317
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1086, 1086 (1987). Although Dickman advocates an examination of
national health insurance and a national health service, this Note assumes that the para-
digm shift in health care will evolve within a public or private managed competition frame-
work. See supra part I.
307. See Dana Priest, A Holistic Approach to Backing Health Reform: Almost
Half of Clinton Plan's Cosponsors Have Also Lent Their Names to Competing Bills,
WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1993, at A6.
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identify and evaluate the underlying value conflicts and deter-
mine appropriate tradeoffs, the intervention will be more ra-
tional. An open process is one that is exposed to public scru-
tiny. Consistent solutions will avoid gaps and conflicts in the
law and strive toward a more unified approach. Coherence may
be assured through a straightforward mechanism to guide the
interpretation and enforcement of the law. An intervention is
legitimate if principled and developed by the rule of law. Fi-
nally, flexibility is necessary to allow the law to adapt to chang-
ing industry conditions.
B. Proposed Initiatives
Each branch of government has different powers and con-
tributes distinctive competencies to improving federal law gov-
erning provider behavior, and avenues exist to begin the process
of clarifying and harmonizing provider standards. This Note
recommends a program of executive, agency, legislative, and
judicial interventions to maximize the competencies of each
branch and set the stage for regulatory reform.
1. Executive and Administrative Initiatives
Remarkably few statutory and regulatory changes in fed-
eral health law have occurred during the recent health reform
debate.308 Absent new legislation, the relevant agencies may be
expected to apply the existing regulatory framework and con-
tinue present policies. Several existing executive branch alter-
natives may provide an inexpensive, straightforward process for
resolving policy conflicts among agencies or between agencies
and federal health policy.
The President has vast authority to initiate and effect con-
trols over administrative agencies through the process of ap-
pointment and removal30 9 and oversight of agency authority.310
308. Timothy S. Jost, Waiting for Reform: Developments in the Law of Health Care
Access & Finance: 1992-1993, 22 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 63, 63 (1994).
309. U.S CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizing presidential appointment of public
officials); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926) (sanctioning an implied power
of presidential removal authority).
310. Myers, 272 U.S. at 117, 135 (construing Article II as the source of presidential
authority to secure uniform execution of the laws through agency supervision and
guidance).
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Executive coordination of agency regulation is often accom-
plished by executive orders and is important because although
Congress establishes the goals, it seldom legislates the
details of every action taken in pursuit of these goals or
makes the balancing choices that these decisions require. It
has assigned this task to the regulatory agencies. Each regu-
latory agency, however, usually is given a set of primary
goals, without specific regard for whether proposed actions in
pursuit of those goals might conflict with the pursuit of other
goals by other agencies. An effective mechanism is needed to
coordinate agency decisions with the judgments of officials
having a broader perspective, such as the President and
Congress.311
a. Interagency Task Forces
Interagency task forces could begin to study and report on
effective mechanisms for coordinating agency activities and
minimizing conflicting directives. HHS has recommended an
interagency task force to examine the interrelationship between
antitrust and health policy, and a staff-level working group
from HHS and the antitrust enforcement agencies has begun to
share information.812
At higher levels, the executive branch should use inter-
agency policy councils to provide agencies with policy guide-
lines. For example, senior officials from the Justice Department
and the OIG have begun meeting formally to develop a na-
tional enforcement policy for health care fraud. 13 The Execu-
tive Level Health Care Fraud Policy Group has discussed strat-
egies for identifying and investigating fraudulent practices.
While interagency coordination is important for effective
enforcement, such a policy group also could improve compli-
ance with federal law by providing health care providers with
clear and coherent guidance on the types of transactions com-
311. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Pres-
idential Review of Agency Rulemaking, Recommendation 88-9, 54 Fed. Reg. 5207, 5208
(1989). See also Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative
Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 491, 514 (1987).
312. HHS to Remain Neutral on Hospital Merger Enforcement, supra note 301, at
71.
313. Officials Hold Regular Meetings to Combat Medicare Fraud, DOJ Says, 2
Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 951 (May 30, 1994).
314. Id.
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mon to integrated system development. The Justice Depart-
ment, an executive agency, and the FTC, an independent com-
mission, used an interagency approach to develop the policies
embodied in the health care enforcement guidelines.315 Al-
though the guidelines are not exhaustive of all current delivery
models, they do improve clarity for physician integration efforts
and provide analytical guidance for hospital and physician inte-
gration. At the cabinet level, the Domestic Policy Council is
charged with coordinating domestic policy and ensuring consis-
tency with presidential goals, and the HHS Secretary, the At-
torney General, and the Secretary of Commerce are all mem-
bers. 16 Thus, improved policy making through interagency
initiatives may proceed under a variety of models. However,
given the existing tensions among agencies, some type of inter-
agency coordination may be warranted.
b. Superagency Oversight
A new agency could be created and charged with coordi-
nating health policy. For example, the Clinton plan would have
established an independent commission, the National Health
Board (NHB), with responsibility for developing uniform pro-
vider quality and performance measures and defining require-
ments for qualified health plans. 17 Federal administration of
health care would have been divided among the NHB and ex-
isting federal agencies, but the NHB would have had access to
all relevant information from executive agencies.318 While re-
sponsibilities for coordination of agency activities could be con-
sidered for an entity such as the NHB, Congress is unlikely to
create new federal agencies to oversee health reform.31 9
Instead of creating a new agency to harmonize and clarify
provider standards, existing mechanisms for agency coordina-
315. See supra notes 157-58 and surrounding text.
316. Exec. Order No. 12,859, 3 C.F.R. 628 (1994).
317. WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL. THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH SECUR-
ITY PLAN 44-45 (1993) (discussing the authority of the National Health Board under the
Clinton plan). See also H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1503 (1993) (outlining the
general duties and responsibilities of the National Health Board).
318. H.R. 3600 § 1505(c).
319. See Sara Fritz, Critics Say Flaws Riddle Health Care Reform Plan, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1993, at A22. See also Senator Robert Dole, Speech Before the U.S.
Senate (Aug. 9, 1994) in 60 VITAL SPEECHES 678 (1994) (noting that Republican reform
efforts do not include a National Health Board).
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tion could reform the rules that govern provider behavior. Co-
ordination of agency policy making often is carried out cen-
trally through the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB).320 The Reagan administration frequently used execu-
tive orders to centralize executive oversight of agency policy
making through OMB coordination. 321 However, the OMB co-
ordination process may lack integrity. The most noteworthy
criticisms of OMB coordination have been its secrecy and lack
of accountability, delays in rulemaking, and lack of expertise in
the regulated area. 22
President Clinton has revoked President Reagan's execu-
tive orders dealing with centralized OMB coordination and re-
placed them with Executive Order 12,866.23 Executive Order
12,866 establishes principles to guide regulatory programs in-
cluding the examination and modification of existing regula-
tions, avoidance of regulations that are inconsistent or dupli-
cate those of other federal agencies, and the assessment of
alternate forms of regulation, including a preference for speci-
fying performance objectives over means. 24 OMB's role of en-
suring consistency with presidential objectives and reducing in-
teragency conflict is housed within the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). 25
The authority of Executive Order 12,866 could be invoked
to provide executive oversight for the regulatory process affect-
320. See, e.g., 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3503 (1988) (establishing the Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to review and approve agency regulations requiring
the collection of information).
321. See Bruff, supra note 311, at 514 (discussing Executive Order 12,291 require-
ments for OMB review and clearance on proposed and final regulations and Executive
Order 12,498 requiring OMB agenda coordination). Exec. Order 12,291 required agency
use of cost-benefit analysis in preparing a regulatory impact statement, and Executive Or-
der 12,498 required agencies to submit their regulatory program to OMB for coordination
and review. See id.
HHS anti-kickback safe harbor regulations have been released from regulatory impact
statements requiring OMB coordination under Exec. Order No. 12,291 or the Regulatory
Flexibility Act because the safe harbors are "designed to permit ... business practices that
encourage competition, innovation and economy." See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 52,723, 52,728
(1992)(commenting on regulations codified at 42 C.F;R. pt. 1001).
322. See generally Pamela M. Foster, Note, A Limit to OMB's Authority Under the
Paperwork Reduction Act in Dole v. United Steelworkers of America: A Step in the Right
Direction, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 153 (1992) (reviewing criticisms of OMB power under Executive
Order 12,291 and the Paperwork Reduction Act and proposing limits on OMB authority).
323. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994).
324. Id.§ l(b).
325. Id. § 2(b).
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ing health care providers. First, interagency conflict would be
reduced by having each agency review its existing health care
regulations for inconsistencies with other federal agencies.326
The knowledge and understanding of each agency's statutory
commands and regulatory priorities could emanate from the in-
teragency task force meetings discussed above.3 2 7 A part of this
process should include the identification of legislative mandates
that may become outmoded or unnecessary in a managed com-
petition environment. 28 OIRA may then review "significant
regulatory actions" that create a serious inconsistency or inter-
fere with actions of other agencies or the President's health pol-
icy.3 29 A Regulatory Working Group convened by OIRA may
then serve as a forum for conflict resolution, 3s and conflicts
unresolved by OIRA and the agencies would be resolved by the
President or Vice President with the relevant agency officials.331
Public disclosure of agency-OIRA correspondence and of
OIRA communications with outside interests related to pub-
lished health care regulations would improve public accounta-
bility.3 3 2 This process would force the agencies to work together
and improve regulatory coordination.
c. Administrative Initiatives
Despite the need for direction from the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches, administrative agency decision making will
always be important to administer the health care bureau-
cracy. 33 Agencies have rulemaking responsibilities delegated
by law, but these responsibilities should be carried out with a
full appreciation for overall health policy. A straightforward
process to guide the implementation and enforcement of the
laws is needed, and flexibility is also necessary to adapt to
evolving forms. Besides agency contributions to interagency
326. See id. § 5.
327. See supra notes 315-18 and surrounding text.
328. Recommendations for statutory changes then could be referred to Congress for
legislative initiatives. See infra part V.B.2.
329. See supra note 322, § 3(f), 6(a).
330. Id. § 4(d).
331. Id.§ 7.
332. Id. § 6(a)(3)(B)(ii)(4).
333. James A. Morone, The Health Care Bureaucracy: Small Changes, Big Conse-
quences, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'v & L. 723, 724, 730 (1993) (discussing the distinctly
American bureaucracy of health care).
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policy making, each agency has distinctive competencies in its
primary area of regulation. The turbulent changes in health
care require that each agency's competencies include an aware-
ness and understanding of evolving organizational forms.
The use of advisory opinions by the IRS and FTC and
business review letters by the Justice Department s 4 has al-
lowed these agencies to develop a sense of the types of innova-
tive transactions that providers are undertaking to develop inte-
grated delivery systems. The lack of such a mechanism for
anti-kickback law enforcement by HHS is a liability and has
reduced that agency's effectiveness in dealing with the multi-
tude of new arrangements that require new analytical
approaches.
A bill authorizing HHS to provide advisory opinions on
whether a proposed arrangement violates either the anti-kick-
back statute or the self-referral statute was introduced in the
last Congress.33 5 The OIG strongly opposed the bill on the
grounds that sufficient advice is available, the application mate-
rial would be inadequate for a conclusive determination of the
parties' intent, and the OIG would be unable to respond to the
voluminous requests predicted.336
The OIG's logic is faulty and circular. The reason the
OIG should anticipate voluminous requests is precisely because
providers do not have adequate guidance to deal with the legal
ambiguities of anti-kickback law. Further, adequate procedural
protections can be developed to preserve prosecutorial discre-
tion such as limiting the advisory opinion to factual matters
and including the Justice Department in the review process.
If jurisdictional issues related to the enforcement of criminal
laws concern the OIG, then it may develop enforcement guide-
334. See supra notes 87, 154-56.
335. H.R. 4028, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994).
336. Hoagland Seeks Advisory Opinions from DHHS, HEALTH L. NEWS REP
(Nat'l Health Lawyers Ass'n, Wash., D.C.), Apr. 1994, at 3.
337. See Ways-Means Votes to Require HHS Fraud and Abuse Advisory Opinions,
3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 921 (July 7, 1994) (discussing committee amendments
to limit advisory opinions). For example, the Justice Department analysis for business re-
view letters necessarily involves a determination of the parties' intent regarding anti-com-
petitive conduct. To minimize the risk of devious behavior, the business review process
provides that requesters make full and true disclosure and comply with requests for addi-
tional relevant information. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(5) (1994). Business review letters state
only current agency enforcement intentions, and the Justice Department remains free to
prosecute future violations if required. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(9) (1994).
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lines for potentially criminal violations in cooperation with the
Justice Department like those developed for antitrust enforce-
ment.3 8 The development of advisory opinions would both im-
prove HHS effectiveness and clarify provider expectations.
Other avenues are available to ensure that agencies are
aware of industry trends. Notice and comment on proposed
regulations provide agencies with information on provider con-
cerns.339  Agencies also might consider using negotiated
rulemaking procedures to allow more formal industry participa-
tion in rulemaking.3 0 Each agency should be current regarding
industry trends, specific transactions providers contemplate,
and the purposes and motives for provider development of inte-
grated delivery systems. As each agency takes steps to inform
itself, health care providers have the corollary obligation to
provide full and frank disclosure and cooperation in ensuring
that federal agencies adequately understand the problems they
face.
2. Legislative Initiatives
One obvious avenue for intervention is Congress. As a
matter of institutional competence, Congress is best suited to
address broad policy issues not requiring special agency exper-
tise. Yet, often it is difficult for Congress to implement its value
choices effectively. 41 Whatever reforms Congress may enact in
the health care arena, the administrative structure for health
care regulation should receive priority. 42 Congressional inter-
ventions may be limited to congressional oversight functions,
338. The antitrust enforcement guidelines include a qualification that physician ven-
tures within the guidelines will not be challenged "absent extraordinary circumstances,"
but they also provide analytical guidance for ventures outside the safe harbors. 1994 ANTI-
TRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 158, at S-16 to S-17.
339. For notice and comment requirements in agency rulemaking, see Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
340. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (Supp. V 1993).
341. Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction
of American Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 439, 442 (1993) (discuss-
ing the reasons for congressional delegation of value choices).
342. See James A. Morone, The Administration of Health Care Reform, 19 J.
HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 233, 236 (1994) (arguing that reformers who ignore administra-
tive structure do so at their peril). Other than the conventional delegation of rulemaking
authority, the President's health plan contained little guidance on how to reform agency
policy making. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE REFORM (1994).
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include specific reforms, or encompass a comprehensive statu-
tory scheme. More important is the requisite guidance on im-
portant health policy choices.
a. Oversight functions
A relatively informal process for congressional intervention
is through oversight functions. Besides the appropriations pro-
cess, each agency is subject to congressional oversight by many
standing committees.343 Joint committees also have held hear-
ings in recent years to oversee conflicts among agencies." In
addition, the House Government Operations Committee and
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee review the effi-
ciency and economy of all governmental operations and
activities. 45
Any of these committees could conduct hearings and in-
vestigations to oversee the regulatory agenda and to identify
and resolve interagency problems or conflicts with health pol-
icy. However, congressional oversight is resource-intensive,
often perfunctory, and better used to police agency perform-
ance.346 While these hearings may serve the important first step
of obtaining information to monitor and control agency activ-
ity, they are an inefficient and ineffective tool for harmonizing
provider standards.
b. Specific Proposals
Specific legislative interventions within each area of law
have been recommended to address problems with anti-kick-
back and self-referral, tax exemption, and antitrust law. Con-
gressional delegation of power to the OIG for development of
safe harbors consistent with beneficial industry changes has
343. Examples would include the Senate Judiciary Committee on Antitrust, Monop-
olization and Business Rights, the Senate Finance Committee on Medicare and Long-term
Care, and the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees.
344. See, e.g., the hearings held before the Joint Economic Committee's Subcommit-
tee on Investment, Jobs, and Prices to review hospital merger policy inconsistencies be-
tween HHS and the Justice Department. Hudson, supra note 255, at 40; Officials Chal-
lenge Perception that Antitrust Law Hampers Hospital Efficiency, 63 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1572, at 14, 15 (July 2, 1992).
345. CONGRESSIONAL YELLOW BOOK, at 111-38, IV-47 (1993).
346. Barry W. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congres-
sional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J PoL
ECON. 765, 766-70 (1983).
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been ineffective in providing the industry with guidance on law-
ful arrangements. Congress has specified the anti-kickback ar-
rangements it wishes to condemn, but direction on the types of
organizational arrangements allowed is needed. 47 Congres-
sional intervention has been recommended in the area of tax
exemption because tax subsidies are involved and because the
IRS lacks expertise in health policy. 48 As well, broad statutory
antitrust exemptions for health care providers have been
proposed. 49
However, piecemeal solutions to the problems enumerated
in this Note will replicate existing problems and enshrine the
current schizophrenia surrounding health care federal law.
Given the potential for conflict among federal statutes and reg-
ulations governing provider behavior, a more comprehensive
legislative direction on the desirability and extent of harmoniz-
ing provider standards may be needed.
c. Comprehensive Statutory Scheme
The lack of consistency and uniformity in health care pro-
vider regulation makes providers dependent upon attorneys for
a thorough review and parsing of the numerous statutory re-
quirements. For example, the development of physician-hospi-
tal joint ventures is "a lawyer's dream and a provider's
nightmare" due to the elaborate regulatory framework.350
One attorney argues that inconsistent standards for man-
aged care products should be eliminated through the develop-
ment of a uniform managed care code and that health lawyers
should think of themselves as chattel mortgage lawyers before
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was developed.3 51 Al-
347. Frankford, supra note 45, at 1877-78.
348. Colombo & Hall, supra note 95, at 31-33.
349. See Bloch & Falk, supra note 139, at 27 (criticizing broad exemptions for
health care providers).
350. Donald L. Holmquest, Implementing Managed Care Opportunities through
Physician/Hospital, and Provider/Insurer, in MANAGED HEALTH CARE: LEGAL & OPERA-
TIONAL ISSUES FACING PROVIDERS. INSURERS. AND EMPLOYERS 145, 152 (PLI Com. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 393, 1986). See also Tedrick, supra note 31, at 557
(describing the legal assistance required for anti-kickback protection as a "pot of gold" for
attorneys).
351. Bruce S. Wolff, Keynote Address Before the National Health Lawyers Associa-
tion (Jan. 6, 1994), in HEALTH LAW. NEWS REP., Jan. 1994, (Nat'l Health Lawyers Ass'n,
Wash., D.C.), at 3 (commenting on the stringent obligations imposed on HMOs as com-
pared with other managed care products).
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though the UCC was developed as a model for uniform state
legislation, the analogy is illustrative. The purposes of the UCC
were to simplify, clarify, modernize, and unify the law of com-
mercial transactions. 52 Although the UCC took over a decade
to draft and did not reduce the need for lawyers, commercial
lawyers now can render clearer advice to clients on commercial
transactions. 53  Like commercial lawyers, health care lawyers
need greater certainty and predictability in providing advice to
clients, especially regarding integrated delivery transactions.
As Congress reconsiders reforms for the health care sys-
tem, it should consider the specific policy goal of harmonizing
and clarifying health care provider standards. Achieving uni-
formity would be difficult because Congress may experience in-
herent institutional difficulties in developing and codifying its
expectations for provider behavior. A uniform code for health
care providers would force political accountability for making
the difficult trade-offs entailed by health care cost, quality, and
access issues. 4 Due to the tremendous activity in private sec-
352. U.C.C. § 1-102.
Prior to the U.C.C.'s adoption, there were a wide variety of security devices, each
with a different filing system for each security device which was subject to filing
requirements. The recognition of so many separate ... devices had the result that
. .. each .. .had to be separately checked to determine a debtor's status.
[D]espite the great number of security devices there remained gaps in the struc-
ture. The growing complexity of financing transactions forced legislators to keep
piling new [statutes] on top of our inadequate and already . . . complicated...
security law[s]. The results were increasing costs to [secured parties and debtors],
and increasing uncertainty.
Olivia F. Gallo, Conflict Between the Uniform Commercial Code and the Federal Tax
Lien Act, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The resulting lack of predictability and uniformity led to a crazy quilt of uniform
statutes dealing with commercial law, including the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law, and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. WILLIAM D. HAWK-
LAND. U.C.C. SERIES § 1-102:03 (1984). The UCC drafters realized that a comprehensive
and systematic body of commercial law would be difficult because these areas of commer-
cial law were intertwined, used different terms, and lacked uniformity and certainty. Id.
353. Interview with Spencer Neth, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity in Cleveland, Ohio (March, 1994).
354. But see Rosenblatt, supra note 341, at 442 (discussing the practical problems
with congressional mechanisms to enforce value choices). For discussions regarding the
difficult interrelationships among cost, quality, and access choices surrounding health pol-
icy, see generally Victor R. Fuchs, The Counterrevolution in Health Care Financing, 316
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1154 (1987); Arnold S. Relman, The National Leadership Commis-
sion on Health Care, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 706 (1987); Stephen M. Shortell & Walter
J. McNerney, Criteria & Guidelines for Reforming the U.S. Health Care System, 322
NEw ENG. J. MED. 463 (1990); Paul Starr, The Framework of Health Care Reform, 329
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1666 (1993).
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tor market innovation, the delineation of statutory standards
may be too rigid and proscriptive and lack the flexibility re-
quired by the dynamic health care environment. Further, it is
doubtful that health care antitrust law could ever be reduced to
a code because the competitive effects of an arrangement are
an essential ingredient of the analysis. Nonetheless, by simply
reconciling conflicting statutory obligations and improving the
rulemaking procedures, Congress could begin to unify and clar-
ify provider standards, improve policy outcomes, and reduce
challenges of agency action.
d. Policy Agenda
As Congress attempts to develop a consensus on the proper
structure of the nation's health care system, the time-consum-
ing nature of a comprehensive code may be impractical and
unnecessary. However, if Congress fails to provide clear guid-
ance to the regulatory process, the regulation of health care
providers may be incongruent with national health policy. The
need for congressional debate surrounding the problems identi-
fied in this Note bears directly on developing health care policy
and is critical to any reform initiatives that rely upon private
sector organization and delivery. The following questions are
important issues to place on the congressional agenda:
1. What are the proper roles for federal agencies in structuring
the reformed health care industry? What legislation is neces-
sary to improve interagency coordination? How may agency
coordination contribute to the congressional goals of health
reform?
2. Is there a desirable level of provider integration? Or should
federal law support multiple integration options as a vehicle to
promote pluralism and increase consumer options?
3. Should the federal government encourage or discourage de-
velopment of for-profit forms of integrated delivery systems?
Should it encourage or discourage integrated delivery systems
development at all? Do integrated delivery systems provide
benefits that are worthy of tax exemption and that protect suffi-
ciently against potential fiduciary conflicts and Medicare pro-
gram abuse?
4. Should changes in provider behavior, including physicians,
be effected by changes in financial incentives? If so, can these
changes be made without creating fiduciary conflicts? What
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are the appropriate limitations on physician compensation and
risk sharing under health plans designed to constrain
utilization?
Answering these broad policy questions is outside the
scope of this Note. These questions simply provoke discussion
surrounding the issues identified in this Note and highlight the
unresolved policy choices available to the next Congress. None-
theless, congressional debate surrounding these issues and legis-
lation to modernize the laws governing health care providers
would inform federal agencies, providers, and the public and
would begin to align health care policy with the new health
care marketplace.
3. Judicial Interventions
Judicial interventions involve using the courts to challenge
the legal basis of agency actions. Challenging regulatory ac-
tions through the courts has limited effectiveness in securing
harmonized provider standards because of the time and ex-
pense involved in litigation and appellate advocacy and because
the outcome is very uncertain. In the absence of clear congres-
sional intent, agency interpretations of law are entitled to great
deference. 5 The Court will defer to reasonable agency con-
structions of statutes that involve conflicting policies.3 56 Thus,
because Congress has not provided a clear legal framework for
the laws regulating providers, agencies often will have consider-
able discretion in interpreting federal law and are protected
somewhat from judicial challenges by providers.
Yet, judges are still the "final arbiters of statutory mean-
ing,"' 3 57 and courts can provide a safety net for resolution of
interagency conflicts and inconsistencies in the application of
federal laws. 358 Factors influencing judicial deference include
longstanding or consistent application of the agency's construc-
tion, statutory authority for rulemaking, public reliance on
355. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (upholding an EPA definition of a vague
statutory term based on its legislative authority to fill in the gaps).
356. Id. But see Rosenblatt, supra note 341, at 452-56 (illustrating that the lack of
congressional clarity results in inconsistent judicial approaches).
357. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 725 F.2d 761, 767 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (discussing the tension between the deference rule and judicial intervention).
358. See generally Russell L. Weaver, Challenging Regulatory Interpretations, 23
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 109 (1991) (outlining tactics to avoid the deference rule).
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agency interpretations, and a subject matter requiring special
expertise. 59 Inconsistencies in application of the law and inter-
agency conflicts surrounding broad policy goals not requiring
any special agency competence appear most vulnerable to judi-
cial intervention. For example, Peters argues that the inconsis-
tencies in application and lack of a statutory basis for limits to
physician governance of tax-exempt integrated delivery systems
is likely to cause a legal challenge to the IRS rules.360
This Note has identified numerous other issues that may
subject agencies to judicial challenge given the irregularities
identified, the lack of a consistent framework, and the broad
health policies involved. Further, the increasingly competitive
nature of the market accentuates disparities that may have
been disregarded in a more stable era. As the market tightens
and providers perceive that the rules of the game are irrational
or bestow unfair advantage to competitors, providers likely will
use the courts to challenge the regulatory framework. To avoid
protracted litigation, the executive and administrative branches
would be well-served by initiatives to clarify and harmonize
provider standards that will withstand judicial scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has reviewed the effects federal laws governing
Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback and self-referrals, health
care provider tax exemptions, and antitrust have on the efforts
of health care providers to develop integrated delivery systems.
In particular, these federal laws place many restrictions on pro-
vider efforts to integrate with one another and to integrate
health care delivery with financing. As providers integrate and
develop transitional delivery and financing vehicles, the distinc-
tions among providers and between delivery and financing are
beginning to blur. As a result, historical approaches to regula-
tion produce many inconsistencies. In combination, these fed-
eral laws also produce conflicting directives.
Regulatory approaches, designed for an earlier era, need
to be revamped. This process will not be easy and will require
deliberate policy choices among cost, quality, and access goals.
359. Colin L. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 562 n.95 (1985).
360. Peters, supra note 43, at 766.
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However, since private sector health care delivery is the center-
piece of most reform efforts, health care providers necessarily
need clarity and direction on the types of arrangements consid-
ered lawful and legitimate under federal law.
To begin this process, each branch of the federal govern-
ment has an important role to play. Executive and administra-
tive agencies should begin to develop an open and inclusive pro-
cess for improving consistency and reducing interagency
conflicts. Solutions should avoid gaps and conflicts in the law
and strive toward a unified approach through the coordination
of interagency policy making. Executive Order 12,866 provides
the means for the executive branch to perform this function. A
straightforward, inexpensive process also is needed to guide the
interpretation and enforcement of administrative law and sup-
port a flexible approach to new and evolving organizational
forms. Congress is best suited to ensure that harmonized pro-
vider standards are consistent with national health policy goals.
Congress must begin to identify and evaluate clearly the under-
lying value conflicts to guide agency policy making. In this
way, Congress may ensure that agency reforms reflect broad
political support and include the consideration of diverse and
often conflicting policy goals. Finally, courts play an important
role in assuring the accountability of the other branches and
providing a forum for providers to challenge regulatory incon-
sistencies. The transformation of health care delivery and fi-
nancing warrants this comprehensive reexamination of the legal
and regulatory framework governing health care providers.
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